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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented to this Court for review:
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the district court correctly rule that the broken asphalt which
caused plaintiff to trip was a "temporary" condition for which she had the burden to show
that defendant had notice of and an opportunity to cure in order to assert a prima facie
case of negligence?
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and accompanying memorandum (R. 58-136), plaintiffs opposition to motion for summary
judgment (R. 320-402, 410-492), and defendants' reply memorandum in further support of
motion for summary judgment (R. 506-514).
Standard of Review: Trial court's legal conclusions in granting summary judgment are
reviewed for correctness. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, ^f
13,70P.3d904.
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the district court err in ruling that there were no factual issues
to support plaintiffs argument that defendant had notice or that constructive notice could
be inferred or that the condition had existed for some period of time due to plaintiffs
"wholesale failure" to properly controvert the facts as required by Rule 7(c)(3)(B) and the
undisputed evidence could not support an inference of constructive notice?
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Preservation: This issue was preserved in the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and accompanying memorandum (R. 58-136), plaintiffs opposition to motion for summary
judgment (R. 320-402, 410-492), and defendants' reply memorandum in further support of
motion for summary judgment (R. 506-514).
Standard of Review: A district court's determination to admit as uncontroverted the
facts submitted by an opposing party in support of a motion for summary judgment which
were not specifically controverted is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of
review. Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, 2004 UT App 354, Tf 10, 101
P.3d 371, cert, denied 123 P.3d 815.
The court's further holding that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to
survive summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2007 UT 249, ^
8, 166 P.3d 655, citing Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, ^ 6. "Although upon summary
judgment the court must view all facts and inferences in favor of the non moving party, it
may not assume facts for which no evidence is offered." Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA,
2002 UT 42, \ 20, 48 P.3d 941. When a moving party has presented sufficient evidence
to support the claim for judgment as a matter of law, and the opposing party fails to meet
its burden to provide some evidence creating an issue of material fact, the trial court is
justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present or would be at trial. Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) citing Dupler v. Yates,
351 P.2d 624, 636-37 (Utah 1960).
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ISSUE NO. 3: Did the district court correctly rule that the Release signed by
plaintiff unambiguously barred her negligence claim against defendant Gold's Gym for
injuries sustained in the parking lot?
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and accompanying memorandum (R. 58-136), plaintiffs opposition to motion for summary
judgment (R. 320-402, 410-492), and defendants' reply memorandum in further support of
motion for summary judgment (R. 506-514).
Standard of Review: A district court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed
for correctness. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2007 UT 249, \ 8 citing Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT
18, Tf 6. The "facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are examined in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007
UT52,TJ2, 167 P.3d 1011.
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the district court commit reversible error in striking plaintiffs
designation of "Clay" and Leslie Thornton as experts despite her concession not to call
them as experts and striking David Jenkins as an expert witness for her failure to comply
with Rule 26 by not providing a report, or any of the other information required by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? And did the district court commit reversible error in
striking photographs which were first produced as attachments to plaintiffs motion to
reconsider?
Preservation: This issue was addressed in defendants' motion and memorandum to
strike plaintiff s designation of expert witnesses (R. 152-173), defendants' motion and
memorandum to strike plaintiffs photographs (R. 639-640640 and 650-686), plaintiffs
3

response to motion to strike designation of expert witnesses (R. 287-291), plaintiffs
response to motion to strike designation photographs (R. 702-705), and defendants'
motion and memorandum in support of Rule 37 motion to compel (R. 174-209).
Standard of Review: A district court's evidentiary rulings striking plaintiffs expert
witness designation and photographs are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
American Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16, | | 10, 22, 41 P.3d
1142.
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the district court commit reversible error in denying plaintiffs
motion for reconsideration?
Preservation: This issue was addressed in plaintiffs motion and memorandum for
reconsideration of order granting summary judgment (R 545-632), defendants'

'?t

memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion for reconsideration (R.641-649), and
plaintiffs reply in support of motion for reconsideration (R. 687-695).
Standard of Review: Motions to reconsider are not recognized by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24,fflf5, 7-8, 135 P.3d 861. "Because trial
courts are under no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to
address or not to address the merits of such a motion is highly discretionary." Tschaggeny
v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37, *{ 15, 163 P.3d 615. The trial court's ruling may not be
overturned unless "there is no reasonable basis for the decision." Langeland v. Monarch
Motors, 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). As the order granting
summary judgment had not been entered prior to the filing of the motion for
reconsideration, Johnson's motion for reconsideration was simply reargument of her
4

opposition to the motion for summary judgment which the trial court was free to entertain
at any point prior to entry of the summary judgment. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882
P.2d 650 (Utah 1994).
ISSUE NO. 5: Did the district court have jurisdiction to decide the motion for
summary judgment when the matter was transferred to Judge Mortensen in American
Fork from Provo by Judge Howard who had recused himself to avoid the appearance of a
conflict?
Preservation: Appellee's believe Johnson waived any contention related to the Order of
Recusal, Reassignment, and Transfer entered on May 15, 2007, by failing to raise any
opposition in any of the many pleadings she filed with Judge Mortensen in American
Fork including her opposition to the motion for summary judgment during the 5 months
the case was pending until after summary judgment was entered against her. This issue
was first raised in Johnson's motion for reconsideration of the motion for summary
judgment and therefore was not preserved for appeal. (R 545-632).
Standard of Review: "[C]laims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, 1 9, 46 P.3d 230 {quoting State v. Holgate, 2000
UT 74, ]f 11, 10 P.3d 346). An issue not preserved for appeal will not be reviewed on
appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^J
14, 128 P.3d 1171.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a premises liability action wherein Nelda P. Johnson ("Johnson") claims to
have tripped and fallen on broken asphalt in the parking lot a few steps from the front
5

door of Gold's Gym at 470 North and 900 East in Provo, Utah on or about July 12, 2004.
The landowner, Peay Investment Company, had leased the subject property to Gold's
Gym since February 1995.
On April 13, 2005, Johnson filed her complaint alleging that Gold's Gym and
Peay Investment Company (hereinafter jointly referred to as "Gold's") were negligent in
maintaining the parking lot. After the close of fact discovery on January 30, 2007, and
after Johnson designated her experts on February 28, 2007, Gold's moved for summary
judgment on April 4, 2007, asserting that Johnson had failed to show that Gold's had
either actual or constructive notice of the defect in the asphalt that caused her to fall and
an opportunity to repair the defect before Johnson's fall and that, even if she were able to
produce such evidence, Johnson had released Gold's Gym from liability when she signed
the Contract upon becoming a member of the gym.
Three months later, on June 29, 2007, Johnson filed her memorandum opposing
the motion. Therein, Johnson failed to controvert the facts set forth in the motion for
summary judgment. Instead, Johnson rested upon her unsupported denials of the
undisputed testimony that Gold's performed daily inspections of the parking lot and had
no notice of any defect in the parking lot, bald assertions that her demand for monetary
compensation she sent to Gold's after her fall as well as other events occurring after her
fall could support an inference of constructive notice prior to her fall, and pure
speculation regarding when the condition may have occurred.
Thereafter, in a memorandum decision, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Gold's having determined as a matter of law that the broken asphalt
6

which Johnson contended caused her to trip was a condition for which, in order to
maintain her claim for negligence, Johnson would have to be able to show notice and an
opportunity to cure and that there were no genuine issues of material fact to permit the
case to go to a jury where Johnson had not shown or produced any evidence that Gold's
knew or should have known of the broken asphalt, let alone had time to fix it.
Additionally, the district court held that Johnson released Gold's from ordinary
negligence liability for the injuries she sustained in the parking lot when she signed the
Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident Release.
Thereafter, Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration to which she attached her
own declaration as well as photographs. Some of those photographs had not been
produced despite having been subject to an order to compel that had been previously
granted. The district court denied the motion, finding that it "lack[ed] merif' where
Johnson was simply rearguing her case and presenting "new evidence for which
[Johnson] gives no reason could not have been presented" before. Further, it found that
"[t]o some extent [Johnson] is attempting to supplement the record, perhaps hoping the
appellate court will not be able to make a distinction between the record before the trial
court at the time summary judgment was granted and evidence or arguments presented
subsequent to the memorandum decision." The district court further explained that "[i]t
does not advance the interests of justice or the efficiency of the courts to essentially allow
parties to reargue or represent matters to the court when significant time has already been
expended.. .This concern is even more egregious in this case where the plaintiff party had
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such an exceptionally long extension in which to respond to the motion for summary
judgment."
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS1
L

On April 13, 2005, Johnson filed her complaint. (R. 1- 4).

2.

Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, which was proposed and drafted by

Johnson: (1) fact discovery was to be completed by November 15, 2006; and (2) Johnson
was to identify experts and produce expert reports pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(C) on
December 15, 2006, 30 days from the completion of fact discovery and "expert witness
discovery shall be completed by February 15, 2007." (R. 21-23).
3.

On or about June 20,2006, Johnson identified her daughter Jocelyn Vance,

son-in-law Justin Vance, and son S. Andrew Johnson as "all persons known or believed
to have witnessed" her fall.
4.

On or about December 7, 2006, more than 1 year and 7 months after filing

her complaint, Johnson served her first set of discovery on Gold's Gym.
5.

Earlier that same day, Gold's had agreed to give Johnson an extension to

conduct fact discovery until January 30, 2007. (R. 120).
6.

Thereafter, on or about December 11, 2006, Johnson filed an exact

duplicate set of interrogatories on Peay Investment.
7.

Gold's Gym filed its response to Johnson's interrogatories on January 19,

2007. (R. 43-44).

1

Repeat insinuations that Gold's "failed to" or "finally" provided discovery necessitated
this clarification of the procedural history.
8

8.

At 3:30 p.m. on Friday, January 26, 2007 (four calendar days before the

expiration of the extended fact discovery deadline) without any previous contact with
counsel, Gold's received Johnson's facsimile notice of her intent to depose Robert Peay,
Nate Loftin, Lisa Felsted, and Candy Negrette, the following Tuesday, January 30, 2007,
as well as a notice of intent to depose "Head of Gold (sic) Gym" on February 1, 2007.
Although Johnson only provided Gold's with effectively two business days notice,
Gold's made every effort to accommodate Johnson's discovery demands and informed
Johnson that Troy Peterson, Nate Loftin, Lisa Felsted, and Kandi Negrete, could be
available on Thursday, February 1, 2007. Gold's could not make Robert Peay available
as he was deceased. (R. 122).
9.

On January 30, 2007, Johnson amended her Notice of Depositions for Nate

Loftin, Candy Negrette and Lynette Felstead for February 1, 2007. (Exhibit A)
10.

Johnson did not amend her Notice of Deposition for deposing Robert Peay

and did not notice up a 30(b)(6) deposition of Peay Investment Company.

In her

February 20, 2007 letter, Johnson indicated that her discovery requests from Peay
Investment Company would be satisfied once Peay responded to her interrogatories and
requests for production of documents, stating that once this was received she would be
ready "to go forward to trial." (R. 128).
11.

Peay Investment Company filed its Response to Plaintiffs First Set of

Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on March 5, 2007.2

Johnson contends that Peay's answers to her interrogatories were untimely. It is true
that Peay's discovery responses should have been filed within thirty days, but were not.
9

12.

Following the depositions on February 1, 2007, Johnson assured Gold's

that she would provide her expert reports within the next 10 days. (R. 125).
13.

Instead, however, in a letter dated February 20, 2007, Johnson informed

Gold's that she would identify experts by February 28, 2007, 30 days after the end of fact
discovery. (R. 128-129).
14.

On or about February 28, 2007, Johnson filed her Designation of Expert

Witnesses which consisted solely of providing the name (and in one instance, just the
first name "Clay" without a surname) and contact information of 5 individuals and a
vague description of the subject matter on which those experts might opine. No written
reports or other required information was provided. (R. 47- 49).
15.

In a March 5, 2007 letter, Gold's requested that Johnson provide the expert

reports as required under the rules no later than March 18, 2007. (R. 131- 132).
16.

On March 13, 2007, Gold's agreed to give Johnson one last extension to

provide her expert reports on or before March 21, 2007. (R. 134).
17.

On March 21, 2007, Johnson provided the curriculum vitae and a list of

cases for one of her 5 experts, Dr. Wyman, but did not provide information on any of the
other 4 experts and did not provide any reports. (R. 168).
18.

On April 4, 2007, Gold's filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 58-

136).
However, the delay was due to Peay's mistaken belief that the set of interrogatories and
requests for production of documents addressed to Peay Investment Company was simply
a duplicate copy of the set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents to
Gold's Gym. A response was quickly filed when this error was brought to defendants'
attention.
10

19.

Subsequently, on April 20, 2007, Johnson provided one expert report from

Dr. Wyman. (R. 170).
20.

On April 24, 2007, Johnson filed her Motion for Extension of Time to

Respond to Motion for Summary Judgment requesting a 45 day extension so that she
could: (1) obtain affidavits from her daughter and son in law, Justin and Jocelyn Vance;
(2) review the transcripts from the 5 depositions which had been taken; (3) obtain
affidavits from her own experts; and (4) depose the owner of Peay Investments. Therein,
Johnson asserted that her expert designation substantially complied with the Rules
stating:
Defendants complain that Plaintiffs experts have not provided reports.
They were timely identified...the pleading that identified these experts...
summarizes the essence of their testimony. Rule 26 (a)(3)... requires an
expert report. But the report does not need to be signed by the expert... an
expert's report need not be written and signed by the expert. It may be
signed by the party. Counsel, acting as agent of Plaintiff, signed this
pleading for her. This report gives some notice of what their testimony will
be. Defendants chose to file this motion for summary judgment before they
took any depositions of these witnesses. Plaintiffs should have additional
time to obtain an affidavit from these experts and witnesses.
(R. 140-149).
21.

Thereafter, on April 27, 2007, Gold's filed a motion to strike Johnson's

expert designation as deficient in that it failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(3) in that
among other things, she had not fully identified her experts and had not provided the
necessary reports for four of her proposed experts. (R. 152- 173).
22.

On May 1, 2007, Gold's filed a motion to compel Johnson to produce all

photographs of the condition which she alleged had caused her to trip having been

11

unsuccessful in its good faith attempts to secure the photographs during the previous 12
months. (R. 174-209).
23.

On May 16, 2007, Johnson opposed the motion to strike asserting: (1)

Peay's filing of its discovery responses two months earlier had precluded her from
obtaining her engineer's, David Jenkins, expert report because he needed to know "the
facts related to property management, safety, planning, maintenance, and repair before he
decides whether he has an opinion he may share"; (2) her expert needed her own medical
records from her treating physicians; (3) she needed to depose someone from Peay
Investment. Johnson also withdrew her designation of "Clay" and Leslie Thornton and
acknowledged that Dr. Wallentine would only testify as a treating physician. (R. 287291).
24.

On May 16, 2007, Johnson filed a notice of deposition of Richard Lynn

Tregeagle, co-owner of Peay Investments of her intent to depose him 7 days later on May
24,2007. (R. 305)
25.

That same day, May 16, 2007, Johnson filed a motion to compel Peay to

supplement its responses to discovery asserting that she was entitled to the requested
information in order to determine "how sophisticated of a property owner" Peay was. (R.
292- 304).
26.

Gold's opposed the motion on May 21, 2007, in particular noting that

Johnson's request that Peay identify all properties it currently owned as well as produce
its tax returns for the past five years was irrelevant as the duty of a landowner is the same
regardless of the depth of its pocket. (R. 313- 318).
12

27.

Even though the discovery cutoff had occurred 5 months before, Johnson

was permitted to depose Richard Lynn Tregeagle on June 11, 2007. (Exhibit B).
28.

On June 29, 2007, about 12 weeks after Gold's filed its summary judgment

motion, Johnson filed her opposition. (R. 320- 402).
29.

On July 2, 2007, in a memorandum decision the court, while noting that in

excess of 45 days had elapsed since her motion was filed, granted Johnson an extension
to file her opposition until July 9, 2007. Further, the court denied Gold's motion to strike
Johnson's designation of Drs. Wallentine and Wyman, but granted Gold's motion
striking "Clay" and Leslie Thorton as Johnson had conceded that they would not be
called. Additionally, David Jenkins was stricken as an expert because Johnson's expert
disclosures were substantially deficient. (R. 403-409, Exhibit G). Therein, the district
court explicitly reminded Johnson, in footnote 1, that she had not requested that her
motion to compel be submitted for decision. Moreover, the district court granted Gold's
motion to compel Johnson to disclose all photographs of the site and awarded Gold's its
attorney's fees and costs for having to bring the motion. An order was entered on August
8,2007. (R. 519).
30.

On July 9, 2007, Johnson filed the Affidavits of Justin Vance and Jocelyn

Vance in support of her opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (R. 493-498).
31.

On September 17, 2007, in an 11 page memorandum decision, the district

court granted summary judgment to Gold's finding that the broken pavement was a
condition for which Johnson would have had to been able to show that Gold's had notice
and opportunity to remedy, that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Gold's
13

did not have actual or constructive notice of the broken asphalt or an opportunity to cure
given Johnson's "wholesale failure" to controvert the undisputed facts as required by
Rule 7(c)(3)(B). Further, the court held that Johnson's claims against Gold's Gym were
barred by the release she signed upon joining the gym. (R. 531-541, Exhibit H).
32.

Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration on October 10, 2007. She

asserted that summary judgment was inappropriate where "[s]he said, '[a]lleged fact nos.
11-12 are false.'" Attached to the motion were 9 photographs purportedly taken of the
parking lot months and years after Johnson's fall, 3 aerial photographs asserted to be of
the parking lot taken in 2000, 2004, and 2006,3 as well as Johnson's own declaration.
Therein, for the fist time, Johnson contended that venue of the action was improper in
American Fork. (R. 545- 632).
33.

The Order and Judgment granting summary judgment was entered on

October 18, 2007. (R. 634-637).
34.

On October 24, 2007, Gold's filed its memorandum opposing the motion

for reconsideration and moved to strike the photographs attached thereto. (R. 639- 640
and 650- 686).
35.

On November 2, 2007, Johnson filed her request to submit the motion to

compel she filed more than 6 months earlier for decision. (R. 698- 699).
36.

Johnson filed her notice of appeal on November 17, 2007. (R. 708- 709).

3

Johnson's purpose for attaching the aerial photographs is unclear where the area where
new asphalt was laid was located a significant distance to the north of Gold's Gym and
separated from it by two buildings and an expanse of parking lot.
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37.

On November 29, 2007, the district court issued a memorandum decision

denying Johnson's motion to reconsider and her motion to compel and determined that
Johnson had waived venue concerns by having not raised them earlier. Additionally, the
district court struck the photographs attached to the motion for reconsideration because
the materials had not been previously provided to Gold's and Johnson provided no
justification which would entitle to court to conclude that the evidence was newly
discovered. (R 710-723, Exhibit I).
RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On July 7, 2004, Johnson joined Gold's Gym. (R. 68, 410-419 and Exhibit

C, Defendants' First Set of Requests for Admission, Nos. 1 -3.)4
2.

As a condition of membership, Johnson was required to sign a contract that

included the Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident clause ("Release"). (R. 68, 410419 and Exhibit C, No. 11).
3.

Johnson read, signed and agreed to be bound to the terms and conditions of

the Release. (R. 68, 410-419 and Exhibit C, Nos. 1-10).
4.

The Release executed by Johnson includes the following language:

ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RISK OF ACCIDENT
...ANY PERSON USING THE EQUIPMENT OR THE FACILITIES
DOES SO AT THEIR OWN RISK...and the Gym shall not be liable to
Buyer or Member for any claims, demands, injuries, damages, or actions
arising due to injury to Buyer or Member, their person, or property arising
out of or in connection with the use by Buyer or Member of the services
and facilities or the premises where the same is located and Buyer or
4

Deemed admitted as no response was received from Johnson within 30 days.
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Member hereby holds the Gym, its employees and agents harmless from all
claims which may be brought against them by Buyer or Member or on
either of their behalf for such injuries of claims aforesaid.
Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident. (R. 136).
5.

On or about the evening of July 12, 2004, Johnson tripped and fell in the

parking lot at Gold's' Gym after an hour long kick boxing and injured her knee. (R. 61
and 320).
6.

Johnson claims she tripped and fell on broken asphalt somewhere 5-7 steps

in front of, and to the right of, the front door to Gold's Gym. (R. 96- 97).
7.

Gold's had never observed or been made aware of any dangerous condition,

either cracks or holes, or broken asphalt existing within the asphalt parking lot. Troy
Peterson, the Vice President of Gold's Gym, testified that he regularly inspected the
parking lot and had never seen a condition which required repair.
Q: Have you ever seen a crack in the parking lot that you thought might
pose a danger to a patron?
A: I have not.
(R. 106- 107).
8.

Johnson's counsel asked Mr. Peterson the following:

Q: At any time, have you ever had any information that helped you
understand where [Johnson's] injury happened?
A: No, I have not.
Q: So you've never formed an opinion of where it happened?
Q: I have no idea where it happened.
(R. 103-104).
9.

Kandi Negrete, who was the Assistant Manager at Gold's Gym the time of

Johnson's fall and who has been employed by Gold's Gym at this location since 1999,
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inspected the premises, including the parking lot, on a daily basis. She testified as
follows:
A:
Q:
At

Have I ever looked at the condition of the pavement?
In the parking lot.
Yes.

Q:
Have you ever observed anything in the parking lot that you think—
that you think needed repair?
A:
No.
(R. 110-112).
10.

Nate Loftin, the Maintenance Director at Gold's Gym since July 1999,

similarly testified that he had no prior knowledge of any reports of problems or potential
problems involving the asphalt at the Gold's Gym location where Johnson fell. (R. 115118).
11.

Moreover, despite having more than 1,000 visitors a day, prior to Johnson,

there had been no reports of any accidents or falls in the parking lot caused by cracks,
holes, or broken asphalt. (R. 66, 410-419 and Exhibit D, Nos. 9 and 14 and Exhibit E,
No. 1.)
12.

During her visit to the gym days before her fall, Johnson herself did not

observe any problems with the asphalt or trip hazards. (R. 81:24 - 82:5).
13.

Similarly, Johnson did not see the broken asphalt before she fell and did not

know how long it had existed. (R. 93:18-24).
14.

Lynn Tregeagle, owner of Peay Investment Company, testified, in pertinent

part, as follows:
Q:

So, are you willing to say what you consider a trip hazard as a
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A:

Q:
A:

property owner?
I will tell you that my experience tells me that a trip hazard—
somebody could trip off of that smooth carpeted floor. That's as
far as I—my experience tells me that, because I've done it myself.
So what elevation would you strive to eliminate to make a floor
free from trip hazards? ...
There isn't. Every individual is capable of tripping over a smooth
surface.

(Exhibit F, 35:2- 12).
15.

Johnson has not provided any evidence that Gold's had notice of any

dangerous condition existing in the parking lot prior to her fall. (R. 61-68 and 410-419).
16.

Similarly, Johnson has not provided any evidence of how or when this

break in the asphalt occurred. (R. 61-68 and 410-419).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As the broken asphalt in the parking lot in front of the entrance to Gold's Gym
which Johnson alleges caused her to trip was not created or selected by Gold's, it was a
temporary condition of which notice, either actual or constructive, and an opportunity to
cure are required before liability may attach.
Where Johnson failed to meet her burden of creating any issue of material fact that
Gold's did not have actual notice or constructive notice of the condition, nor an
opportunity to cure the broken asphalt, the district court correctly determined that her
ordinary negligence premises liability claim could not survive summary judgment.
Moreover, the district court also correctly determined that even if Johnson could
show notice and an opportunity to cure, because she signed a Release under which she
clearly and unequivocally released Gold's Gym from its negligence for any and all claims
for injuries sustained on the premises, which included trip and falls in the parking lot, she
could not maintain an action against Gold's Gym.
Lastly, given Johnson's incessant refusal to provide required disclosures or
otherwise comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even after being sanctioned by
the court for her failure to provide the requested discovery, the district court acted within
its discretion in striking Johnson's expert designation of David Jenkins where she failed
to even provide a written report or his qualifications and in striking the photographs
attached to her motion for reconsideration which were never previously provided.
Implicitly recognizing her failure to controvert any of the facts set forth by Gold's,
which undisputedly establish that Gold's did not have actual or constructive notice of the
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broken pavement, Johnson asserts that constructive notice may be inferred based upon
subsequent occurring events and because those performing the daily inspections of the
parking lot for Gold's lacked specific training in asphalt maintenance. She also asks the
court to close its eyes to the fact that one thousand patrons crossed the same area without
incident 6 days a week, that she herself, both in the days before her fall and at the time
she fell, did not see any defect in the asphalt. Additionally, Johnson contends she should
not be held to the terms of the Release because she was distracted and didn't understand
what it was that she signed. As the district court correctly stated, "[t]he sum and
substance" of Johnson's appeal is that "speculation should rule the day."
Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to her, all Johnson has shown after the close of fact and expert discovery is that
she fell in the parking lot and hurt her knee and that she subsequently made a claim. The
undisputed facts are that the parking lot was inspected on a daily basis, that no dangerous
broken asphalt had been observed prior to Johnson's fall, that Johnson herself did not
observe this condition either on the day she fell or at any other time when she frequented
the gym, and that more than 1,000 visitors had safely traversed this same area six days a
week without incident. If summary judgment is not affirmed, the exact scenario the Utah
Supreme Court cautioned against will occur, "not only would the jury have to speculate
about whether [Gold's] had notice of the dangerous gap in the first place, it would also
have to speculate about whether [Gold's] had that notice far enough in advance to repair
the gap before [Johnson's] accident." Goebel v. Salt Lake City S.R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, «jj
25, 104 P.3d 1185.
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ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate in cases involving negligence where the
evidence "is free from doubt so that all reasonable [persons] would come to
the same conclusion." Schnuphase v. Storehouse, 918 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah
1996) (citations omitted).
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT BROKEN PAVEMENT IS A
TEMPORARY CONDITION FOR WHICH NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE IS
REQUIRED.

The law in Utah is well settled that "owners of stores... or other buildings where
the public is invited to come on business or for pleasure are not insurers against all forms
of accidents that may happen to any who come." Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565
P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1977). With respect to slip and falls on a store owner's property,
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he owner of a business is not a guarantor that
his business invitees will not slip and fall." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d
476, 478 (Utah 1996) {quoting Preston v. Lamb, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968)).
Rather, a Utah business owner "is charged with the duty to use reasonable care to
maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe condition for his patrons."
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478.
A business owner's duty of reasonable care in slip and fall cases is dependant
upon the nature of the condition: a condition is either a permanent condition or a
temporary condition. Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975);
Jex v. JRA, 2007 UT App 249, ^ 10. The distinction between a permanent condition and
a temporary condition lies in how the condition came to be.
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Specifically, if a condition was created or chosen by a defendant such as "the
structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or its manner
of use" it is a permanent condition and the defendant is deemed to have knowledge of the
condition that it created and no further proof of notice is necessary. Allen, 538 P.2d at
176. See also Canfieldv. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) cert, denied
853 P.2d 897 (negligent method of operation in lettuce display created by defendant
grocery store was permanent condition for which defendant was presumed to have
notice).
In contrast, a condition which is created or chosen by nature or a third party is a
temporary condition and a store owner only has a duty to remedy once it has notice of the
condition. Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1977) (ice on
sidewalk); Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478 (scoop of ice cream dropped on the floor by
another customer); Jex v JRA, 2007 UT App 249, n. 1 (snow melting from shoe of
delivery driver).
When a defendant did not create a condition, the Utah Supreme Court has
explicitly held that a plaintiff must present "evidence of notice and a reasonable time to
remedy . . . to survive a motion for summary judgment" in a situation where a "plaintiff
alleges that a defendant... negligently allowed an otherwise safe condition to degrade
over time into a dangerous condition." Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co., 2004
UT 80,122. As aptly stated by Johnson, the rationale for requiring notice is "that a party
may not know about the unsafe condition long enough to require them to fix it before
someone is hurt." (Br. Appellant at 36).
22

Johnson asserts that "[t]he unsafe asphalt clearly occurred over time and is a result
of lack of maintenance. But these facts do not mean that the condition is temporary in
nature." (Br. Appellant at 32).

Rather, Johnson proposes that because Gold's is

"responsible for the condition because of their duty as possessors of land to business
invitees" and that "duty is permanent, not temporary" the broken asphalt "should be
evaluated under the same standard as an unsafe condition of a permanent nature." (Br.
Appellant at 37).
Johnson's creative contention that because Gold's had a "permanent" duty to
maintain the parking lot, any defect found therein should also be considered "permanent"
of which Gold's should be presumed to have had notice, is contrary to Utah law.
Adoption of Johnson's formulation of premises liability would result in business owners
becoming the insurers of the safety of their invitees.
Broken asphalt in a parking lot is not a "permanent" condition of which Gold's is
presumed to have notice because Gold's did not create or chose the condition. Rather it
is a condition which may have occurred spontaneously or evolved over time and for
which Gold's is responsible only in the context of maintenance. See Goebel, 2004 UT
80,TJ20.
In order to maintain her negligence claim, Johnson would have had to produce
some evidence that Gold's had actual notice that this condition existed in the parking lot
or that this condition had existed for such a long period of time that Gold's would have
constructive knowledge of it. The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly held that "evidence
of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion for summary
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judgment" in a situation where a "plaintiff alleges that a defendant... negligently allowed
an otherwise safe condition to degrade over time into a dangerous condition." Goebel v.
Salt Lake City Southern R. Co., 2004 UT 80, ^ 22.
In Goebel, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant, who had an easement to use
railroad tracks and was required to maintain the tracks, was negligent in permitting a gap
to occur in between two field panels at a railroad crossing and that his bike wheel had
fallen into that gap causing him to crash. In affirming the trial court's directed verdict in
favor of the defendant, the Utah Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs contention that the
gap between the two surfaces was a permanent condition of which defendant was
presumed to have notice. Instead, the court held that the gap was not a permanent
condition. In so holding, the court explained that a permanent condition is one "of a
permanent nature, such as: in the structure of building, or of a stairway, etc. or in
equipment or machinery, or in the manner of use, which was created or chosen by
defendant" Id. \ 19. The rationale is that "it is reasonable to presume that a party has
notice of conditions that the party itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume notice
of conditions that someone else creates, that arise from malfunctions, or that gradually
evolve on their own." Id. f 22 (citations omitted). Accordingly, when a defendant does
not actually create an unsafe condition, but is responsible for it only in the context of
maintenance, then it is not a permanent condition and the plaintiff is required to show
notice in order to proceed with a negligence claim. Id. f 20 {citing Fishbaugh v. Utah
Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998)).
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Applying the analysis elucidated by the Utah Supreme Court in Goebel to this
case, as a matter of law because the condition was not permanent, in order to survive
summary judgment Johnson would have had to have produced some evidence tending to
show that Gold's had notice. "[BJecause here, the defendant did not create the unsafe
condition, and is 'responsible' for it only in the context of maintenance, not for its
existence in the first place" the broken asphalt at issue is not a condition of a permanent
nature for which notice may be presumed. Id. ^ 20.
Goebel is controlling in the present case. Johnson's attempt to distinguish Goebel
from the current case falls flat. Like the plaintiff in Goebel, Johnson herself had only
days before traversed this same area and had not observed the condition. Similar to the
defendant in Goebel who performed regular inspections, here, Gold's performed daily
inspections. Any break in an asphalt parking lot clearly falls within the definition of
temporary condition, as by its nature, was not created or selected by Gold's.

The

undisputed testimony is that Gold's conducted regular daily inspections of the parking
lot, and had no notice whether actual or constructive of any break in the asphalt.
Johnson's proposal that a "defect of the condition of the asphalt ... in a parking lot
of a business ... should be evaluated as a permanent condition of property, and not as a
temporary condition that requires notice and time to fix... before the business may be
held liable" is wholly inconsistent with Utah law. (Br. Appellant at 48). Thus, the
district court correctly determined that the broken asphalt over which Johnson tripped
was a temporary condition of which Gold's would have had to have notice, either actual
or constructive.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT JOHNSON COULD NOT
MAINTAIN HER ACTION ON A THEORY OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.

As a matter of law, Johnson failed to establish constructive notice because
reasonable minds could not differ whether Gold's should have noticed the broken asphalt.
The district court rightly found that no jury could have found Gold's to have constructive
notice based on the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom even in the light
most favorable to Johnson.
Recognizing that Gold's did not have actual knowledge of the broken asphalt,
Johnson argues that she should have been allowed to proceed to the jury under a theory of
constructive notice. However, Johnson's "denial" of Facts Nos. 7 and 11 without setting
forth any specific facts which would be admissible in evidence is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact. Dairy Prod. Servs. v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81, \ 54,
614 P.2d 160 (citations omitted). Johnson's reliance upon her own self serving "affidavit
that merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions is insufficient
to create an issue of fact." Id. at ^ 54, "[B]are contentions unsupported by any
specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will
preclude the entry of summary judgment." Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937,
938 (Utah 1980).
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it deemed
admitted all of the facts which were not controverted due to Johnson's "wholesale failure
to follow Rule 7(c)(3)(B)." (R. 531, n. 1). See Gary Porter Const, v. Fox Const., Inc.,
2004 UT App 354, ^ 10, cert, denied 123 P.3d 815. Summary judgment should
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particularly be affirmed where Johnson continues to rest upon her bare assertion that she
disputes the facts found to be undisputed without producing any evidence to support her
theories.
Constructive notice is "where information or knowledge of a fact is imputed to a
person by law 'because he could have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his
situation was such as to cast upon him the duty of inquiring into it.'" Matheson v.
Marbec Investments, LLC, 2007 UT App 363, ]f 7, 173 P.3d 199 {quoting In re Discipline
ofSonnenreich, 2004 UT 3,1j 22 n. 9).
In Mitchell v. Christensen, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "in determining
what constitutes reasonable care in the discovery of defects, the proper standard is
whether the defect would be apparent to the ordinary prudent persons with like
experience, not to persons with specialized knowledge in the field of construction or real
estate." 2001 UT 80, f 12, 31 P.3d 572.
In Matheson, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
landowner from the premises liability claims asserted by the Plaintiff who was injured by
a broken stair tread at an apartment complex due to Plaintiffs inability to show that
Defendant had notice of the condition. First, the court determined that because the
broken stair tread was a condition which Defendant did not create, it was a temporary
condition for which notice, either actual or constructive, had to be shown by Plaintiff in
order to survive summary judgment. After conceding that Defendant did not have actual
notice of the condition, Plaintiff argued that there was a genuine issue of fact whether
Defendant had constructive notice.
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In support of his argument, Plaintiff contended that constructive notice should be
inferred against the Defendant because, as a general contractor, he should be held to a
higher duty to inspect the building. Plaintiff contended that it was not enough for
Defendant to have performed multiple physical inspections, including an inspection by a
MAI appraiser, 9 months earlier when Defendant purchased the property. While Plaintiff
acknowledged that these inspections would have satisfied the duty owed by an average
defendant without a contractor's license, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had a duty to
perform more thorough inspections due to his training as a general contractor.
The court in Matheson rejected the Plaintiffs suggestion of holding Defendant to
a higher duty of inspections because there was no evidence that Defendant as a general
contractor had "experience constructing stairs in general, let alone his experience
respecting this type of stair design... [i]ndeed, ...Plaintiffs counsel asserted that these
stairs... were something with which [Defendant] had no experience." Id. at ^f 9.
Moreover, the court found that there was no issue of material fact to support a finding of
constructive notice where the multiple inspections performed 9 months earlier satisfied
the Defendant's inspection obligations and stated "in the absence of some other
indication that there was a problem with the stairs, the inspections performed were
completely reasonable under these circumstances and satisfied Defendant's duty of
proper diligence." Id. \ 7.
As support for her argument, Johnson suggests that she be given an "inference"
that Gold's had constructive notice because those performing the daily inspections of the
parking lot did not have specific training in asphalt maintenance and that actions
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occurring after her fall should support an "inference" of notice before her fall. Both
arguments are without merit.
First, Johnson suggests that because those performing the daily inspections of the
parking lot did not have specialized training in asphalt maintenance that those inspections
should be treated as a nullity. The deficiency of this argument is best exemplified by
Johnson's own brief. Therein, Johnson not only recognizes, but in fact cites controlling
case law that constructive knowledge of the defect may only be inferred where the
"defect would be apparent to ordinary prudent person with like experience, not to persons
with specialized knowledge in the field of construction." (Br. Appellant at 23 and 38
citing Mitchell v. Christens en and Matheson v. Mar bee Investments).
Johnson focuses on the phrase "like experience" to assert that those who
performed the daily inspections of the parking lot had to have specialized knowledge in
1
the field of asphalt maintenance in order to identify defects. As elucidated in Matheson,
however, Johnson's assertion that those performing the inspections for Gold's lacked
specialty knowledge only demonstrates that constructive notice cannot be inferred.
Above and beyond the inspections performed 9 months before the plaintiffs injury in
Matheson, here, Gold's performed inspections of the parking lot 6 days a week. While
those performing the inspections were not asphalt experts, they certainly were able to,
and did, exercise reasonable care in inspecting the parking lot and at no time observed
any defects. Moreover, that Johnson herself didn't see the broken asphalt either on the
day she fell or in the days before when she walked over the same area is a resonating fact.
Accordingly much more than an "inference" would be required. In this case, Johnson
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failed as a matter of law to establish constructive notice. The undisputed evidence does
not support even an inference of constructive notice which would enable the case to go to
a jury.
Johnson's second argument that constructive notice might be "imputed" to Gold's
based upon information and actions occurring months and years after her fall should
similarly be rejected. Not only would Johnson be precluded from offering such
information as subsequent remedial repairs, even if she were, it amounts to nothing more
than sheer conjecture and speculation. As plainly stated by this court recently,
"[constructive notice cannot be grounded on speculation or mere allegation." Jex, 2007
UT App at % 13 (citingLindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 284 P.2d 477, 478 (Utah 1955);
accordMahmoodv. Ross, 1999 UT 104, 990 P.2d 933, 938 (Utah 1999) (stating that
"although juries may make deductions based on reasonable probabilities, the evidence
must do more than merely raise a conjecture or show a probability.")
In order for a plaintiff to establish that a temporary condition had existed for a
sufficient amount of time to give a business defendant constructive notice of it, she must
be able to present evidence that "would show from the condition of the debris on the floor
that it had been there for an [] appreciable time." Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568
P.2d 753, 754 (Utah 1977) (inference of constructive notice could be found where dry
spaghetti on floor which was alleged to have cause fall was dirty, crushed into small
pieces and spread into main isle) accord Jex, 2007 UT App at TJ 13 (holding that it would
be improper to impute constructive notice where no evidence to suggest puddle had been
there for any significant period of time).
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In Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998) the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant due to plaintiffs
failure to present evidence of notice and an opportunity to cure. Fishbaugh, who was hit
by a car at night while crossing a public street, sued the city and UP&L for negligently
failing to repair the street lights. Fishbaugh presented evidence that the street lights were
not functioning that night but had no admissible evidence tending to show how long the
street lights had not been functioning. The court found that even if there was evidence
that the defendant had notice of the condition of the street lights, because Fishbaugh had
presented no evidence to indicate how long defendants had such notice, Fishbaugh could
not "prove that [defendants] failed to repair the streetlights within a reasonable time after
receiving notice and that they were thus negligent in maintaining the street lights." Id. at
408.
Similar to Fishbaugh, Johnson produced no evidence to support her assertions that
the broken asphalt had "occurred over time" or that the condition "may have been there
for years." (Br. Appellant at 32). Instead, as support of her proposed "inference" of
constructive notice, Johnson offers "evidence" of subsequent occurring events. She
proposes that her letter to Gold's Gym requesting compensation sent after her fall
provides a sufficient basis from which to infer constructive notice before her fall.
Similarly, Johnson offers photographs taken months and years after her fall (photographs
nos. 3-6 were stricken from the record due to Johnson's failure to produce them prior to
her motion for reconsideration) some showing repairs as evidence to support her theory
that Gold's had constructive notice before her fall. She also offers 3 aerial photographs
31

taken of the parking lot (again produced the first time attached to her motion for
reconsideration). Even if this "evidence"' had been produced prior to Johnson's motion
for reconsideration and had not been stricken, subsequent remedial repairs are not
admissible and do not create an inference of constructive notice. See Potter v. W.H.
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 103 P.2d 2805 282 (Utah 1940) ("Evidence of
alterations or repairs to premises under his control made following an accident therein is
inadmissible to show as against a defendant that the former condition was unsafe or was
being negligently maintained.")
Additionally, given that Gold's Gym is the large square building on the corner of
450 North and 900 East in the aerial photographs (nos. 7, 8, and 9), the entry to which
faces 900 East, and the "repairs" are located a significant distance to the north of the
entrance to Gold's and separated from Gold's by the expanse of two buildings and a
portion of parking lot, the aerial photographs show that the repairs to an entirely different
portion of the parking lot are irrelevant.
Johnson's "mere hypothesis that the [broken asphalt] may have existed for some
unknown length of time does not suffice." Goebel at If 25. The undisputed evidence is
that Gold's Gym had more than 1,000 visitors per day, six days a week in 2004 and not
one of those visitors had ever tripped or reported cracks, holes, or broken asphalt in the
parking lot. Johnson herself didn't even observe this broken asphalt either the days
before the accident or on the day she fell.
At the end of the day, after the close of expert and fact discovery and despite
having conducted numerous depositions and other discovery, there is no evidence from
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which a reasonable jury could conclude that Gold's failed to reasonably inspect the
parking lot and it is undisputed that Gold's did not have actual or constructive knowledge
that there was a break in the asphalt in the parking lot, let alone a reasonable time to
remedy any such condition. Johnson's failure to provide any evidence that Gold's had
actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect or an opportunity to cure is fatal to
Johnson's claims. Fishbaugh at 408. "[A] mere fall does not prima facie establish a jury
question." Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1967). Consequently, this
Court should affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.
III.

THE ' ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RISK OF ACCIDENT9 RELEASE
PRECLUDES PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY AGAINST GOLD'S GYM.
Even assuming Johnson could volley the hurdle of proving notice and an

opportunity to cure, which she has not done, the Release agreed to and signed by Johnson
precludes her recovery against Gold's Gym. In Utah, a party may contract away their
right to recover in tort for damages caused by the ordinary negligence of others. See
Rothstein v. Snowbird, 2007 UT 96, Tf 6, 175 P.3d 560. The general principle is that
"preinjury releases are enforceable." Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, % 13,
171 P.3d 442; accord Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944,
947 (Utah 1959) ("[Ojne may contract to protect himself against liability for loss caused
by his negligence.") Contracts, such as the Release signed by Johnson, are enforced
unless it offends public policy, falls within a public interest exception or is unclear or
ambiguous. None of these exceptions are applicable to the Release Johnson signed and it
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is therefore valid and enforceable. Thus, the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of Gold's Gym should be affirmed.
A.
The Release is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous that Johnson
released Gold's Gym from her negligence claim arising from use of the
premises, which necessarily included the parking lot.
The Release clearly and unequivocally bars Johnson's claims arising out of her use
of the parking lot. When a clause purporting to release one party from liability is clear
and unequivocal in its terms, the clause should be enforced. Russ v. Woodside Homes,
905 P.2d 901, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
In Russ v. Woodside Homes a couple had contracted with a builder to construct their
family home. While on site to observe the construction, the wife tripped and fell on the
property and thereafter died as a result of her injuries. Her husband brought suit against
the builder. In affirming summary judgment in favor of the builder, this court held that
the release clause contained in a paragraph within the construction contract by which the
plaintiff agreed to hold defendant "harmless for 'any and all claims, damages, loss and
expenses' and for 'any death, accident, injury, or other occurrence resulting from visits to
the job site" was enforceable. Id. 906. The clause was held to be a sufficiently clear and
unequivocal expression of the intent to indemnify for a party's own negligence citing to
Freundv. Utah Power and Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990) (internal quotations
omitted) in which the court said, "[i]t is not necessary that the exculpatory language
refers expressly to the negligence of the indemnitee, so long as the intention to indemnify
can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement."
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The intent of the parties in entering the Release to relieve Gold's Gym from
liability for its alleged negligence in maintaining the parking lot is clearly and
unequivocally expressed in the Release. The language of the Release signed by Johnson
parallels the language found to be a clear and unequivocal expression in the Russ case. It
states that Johnson "holds the Gym5 its employees and agents harmless from all claims"
and that "the Gym shall not be liable to [Johnson] for any claims, demands, injuries,
damages or actions arising due to injury."
The language of the clause clearly covers Johnson's claims and injuries arising
from her fall in the parking lot when it states that Gold's is not liable for "any claims,
demands, injuries, damages or actions arising out of or in connection with the use by
[Johnson] of the services and facilities or the premises where the same is located..."
(emphasis added). Johnson contends that the district court committed legal error in finding
that the word "premises" in the Release clearly and unequivocally referred to the parking
lot. Again, Johnson merely concludes that the clause "premises" is ambiguous but fails to
offer an alternative meaning of the term which does not encompass land. In order to be
ambiguous, the term premises would have to be subject to more than one meaning. See
Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, ^f 14, 987 P.2d 48 (an unambiguous contract may be
interpreted as a matter of law). As stated by Johnson, the word "premises" is defined in
the dictionary as "buildings on land." (Br. Appellant at 31). Accordingly, the term
"premises" is not ambiguous and cannot be interpreted in such a way to exclude the
parking lot used by the patrons of Gold's Gym. See Interwest Construction v. Palmer,
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923 P.2d 1350, 1358-1359 (Utah 1996) (stating that unambiguous contract provisions
may be interpreted as a matter of law.)
Johnson relies upon Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., in support of her argument
that she should not be bound by the Release she signed. 839 F.Supp. 789 (D. Utah 1993).
However, at issue in Ghionis was whether the terms "as is" embedded within a ski
equipment rental agreement was an effective disclaimer of the express or implied
warranties relating to the equipment. That the term was not set apart with quotation
marks or bold type, but "slipped into a paragraph without any indication to the average
consumer that they were words of art with distinct legal" meaning lead the court to
conclude that the warranty disclaimer was not conspicuous enough to satisfy the statutory
requirements. Id. at 793.
Even if Ghionis was applicable, from a layman's perspective the Release is
primarily aimed at shifting risk of injury onto the signor and is conspicuous in nature.
The Release is found at the very top of the page and is titled ASSUMPTION OF RISK
AND RISK OF ACCIDENT in capital, bold letters. Moreover, the Release is set apart
from the remainder of the form and is separately signed by Johnson.
Johnson then cites to Adloo v. Brown, 686 A.2d 298 (Md. 1996) in support of her
assertion that an exculpatory clause "should not be enforced when it releases a defendant
from his own negligence."5 (Br. Appellant at 30). Even if Johnson's partial citation was

5

Stating "the general rule -contracts will not be construed to indemnify a person against
his own negligence unless an intention to do so is expressed in those very words or in
other unequivocal terms. Adloo v. Brown, 686 A.2d 298, 302 (Md. 1996) (emphasis
added).
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an accurate statement of Maryland law, such an assertion is clearly contradictory to Utah
law. See Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (discussed
above).
Similarly, Johnson's citations to Johnson v. Rapid City Softball Association, 514
N.W.2d 693 (S.D. 1994) and Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783 (Minn.
2005) are inapplicable and inaccurate. Johnson asserts that the court in Rapid City held that
the release which released the city from negligence in maintaining its public athletic fields
was unenforceable on public policy grounds. (Br. Appellant at 30). However, the Rapid
City court did not invalidate the release, but reversed and remanded the case back to the trial
court to determine whether the player had consented to the release. 514 N.W.2d 693.
Johnson then asserts that the release in Yang was held unenforceable, but cleverly omits that
the court in so holding, found that the defendant was an innkeeper providing a public
service who, for public policy reasons, could not contractually limit their duty to the public.
(Br. Appellant at 30). As discussed below, even if the above cases stood for the
propositions asserted by Johnson, Gold's Gym is not a public entity or an innkeeper
providing a public service, and therefore its contract with Johnson to limit its liability is not
against public policy.
By failing to respond to Defendants' Fist Set of Requests for Admissions, Johnson
is deemed to have read and understood the Release and agreed to be bound by the terms
and conditions therein when she signed the Release of liability form. Johnson asserts in
defense that she was "distracted [] from reading, analyzing and understanding the release
clause" and that "the saleman (sic) did not explain the clause." (Br. Appellant at 25).
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Ignorance, however, is not a defense. See Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 2008 UT
13, % 5, 179 P.3d 760; accordRuss v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d at 906 (explaining
that the "[defendant] is not required to show that the [plaintiff] understood the hold harmless
provision before it asserts the provision's protection. In Utah, contracts mean what they
say, and parties will be bound by them.") Accordingly, Johnson's claimed ignorance does
not preclude the enforcement of the contract she signed. Moreover, if the terms of the
Release were not acceptable to Johnson, she could have elected not to join the Gym.
B.

The Release is not against public policy.

There is no public policy against the enforcement of the Release. A release which
does not invoke public policy will be upheld. Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96,
Tf 6. Johnson makes the syllogistic fallacy that because Gold's Gym has a duty to
maintain its parking lot and that a member of the public might cross its parking lot,
Gold's Gym has a public duty. (Br. Appellant at 28). Johnson's failure to cite to a single
public policy against upholding the release between a private gym and a gym member is
significant.
Unlike the public policy against a parent signing a release of a minor's prospective
claim for negligence, Hawkins v. Pert, 2001 UT 94, ^f 5, 37 P.3d 1062, a release
involving master-servant agreements, Pugmire v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 92 P. 762, 767
(Utah 1907), or where the legislature has clearly articulated public policy and the
implications of that public policy are unmistakable, Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007
UT 94, Tf 15 (held ski resort release unenforceable in light of Utah's Inherent Risk of
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Skiing Act). Here, there is no applicable public policy which renders the subject release
entered into by an adult to become a member of a private gym unenforceable.
C.
Membership in a private gym does not meet the public interest
exception.
Membership in a private gym is a recreational activity that does not constitute a
public interest and therefore, the preinjury release signed by Johnson cannot be
invalidated under the public interest exception. Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation,
2008 UT 13, If 21, 179P.3d760.
Pearce suffered a back injury while riding a bobsled and brought claims against
the owner of the Utah Winter Sports Park. In affirming summary judgment in favor of
the Park on Pearce"s ordinary negligence claim, after surveying the majority of
jurisdictions which have consistently concluded that recreational activities do not fit
within the public interest exception, rather than going through the six factor test set out in
Tunkl v. Reagents of University of California, and adopted by the court in Berry v.
Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly adopted the
general rule that "preinjury releases for recreational activities are not invalid under the
public interest exception." Id. at ^j 21. In so doing, it determined that bobsledding is a
recreational activity that does not meet public interest exception. Id. at 21. Accord
Berry v. Greater Park City Company, 2007 UT 87 (skiercross racing is recreational
activity that does not constitute a public interest).
Here, it is unquestionable that membership in a private gym is a recreational
activity. Accordingly, pursuant to the general rule set forth in Pearce v. Utah Athletic
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Foundation, the preinjury release signed by Johnson does not implicate the public interest
exception and should be enforced.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WTIHIN ITS DISCRETION IN STRIKING JOHNSON'S
EXPERT AND PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED PHOTOGRAPHS DUE TO HER FAILURE
TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE DISCLOSURES.

Johnson's ongoing adamant refusal to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provided ample justification for the court to strike her proposed expert, David
Jenkins and to strike the photographs attached to her motion for reconsideration. The
district court's evidentiary rulings striking Johnson's expert witness designation and
photographs are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. American Interstate
Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App. 16, U 10.
Pursuant to the stipulated scheduling order, Johnson's expert witness designation
was due on December 15, 2007. (R. 21-23). On February 28, 2007, Johnson filed her
designation of expert witnesses. Her designation of expert witnesses consisted solely of
providing the name (and in one instance, just the first name "Clay" without a surname)
and contact information of 5 individuals and a vague description of the subject matter on
which those experts might opine. (R. 47- 49). No written reports or other required
information was provided. (R. 168). Johnson asserted that not only was her designation
timely, but that it fully satisfied her obligations of full disclosure under Rule 26 (a)(3).
(R. 140-149). Subsequently, Johnson withdrew her designation of "Clay" and Leslie
Thornton. (R. 287- 291). Thereafter, the court limited Johnson's treating physician's
testimony to that of a treating provider and struck Johnson's remaining expert designation
of David Jenkins concluding her "disclosures were deficient." (R. 403-409).
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Additionally, the district court acted within its discretion in striking down
Johnson's attempt to "supplement" the record by attaching photographs of the parking lot
which had never been previously provided. Aside from the fact that Johnson had a duty
to disclose such evidence under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, "any
photographs of the alleged negligent condition" had been specifically requested by
Gold's in April 2006 (R. 176) and such photographs were arguably subject to the court's
order compelling Johnson to produce photographs of the alleged condition entered
months before. (R. 403-409). Johnson failed to produce this "evidence" at any time prior
to her motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment.
Given Johnson's repeated attempts to circumvent the purpose underlying Rule 26
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district
court to strike David Jenkins as an expert for Johnson, or to strike the previously
undisclosed photographs.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING JOHNSON'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION MERITLESS.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson's motion for
reconsideration or in refusing to receive the additional evidence attached thereto.
Johnson challenges the court's denial of her motion for reconsideration and asserts that in
filing her motion for reconsideration she had "hoped to ... help the trial court avoid the
embarrassment of being reversed on appeal." (Br. Appellant at 46). As motions to
reconsider are not recognized in Utah, Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, fflf 5, 7-8, Johnson
may be correct in her assessment that "the trial court was obviously perturbed by [her]
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motion for reconsideration." (Br. Appellant at 45). However, Johnson's accusation that
the trial court acted "in the spirit of resentment of having to evaluate the evidence against
summary judgment" and that the "trial court fails to grasp the importance of a fair
litigation process for [Johnson]" is clearly undeserved. (Br. Appellant at 46).
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly discouraged the filing of these motions,
as it is not a permitted or recognized motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Ron
Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1994). Because trial courts are
under no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to address or
not to address the merits of such a motion is highly discretionary. Absent an abuse of
discretion it should not be disturbed. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah
1996); Shepherd v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1994). Under this standard, the trial
court's ruling may be overturned only "if there is no reasonable basis for the decision."
Langelandv. Monarch Motors, 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998).
The district court had ample justification for its refusal to permit Johnson to
reargue her case or to permit Johnson to supplement the record with additional evidence
not previously produced. Even if the additional evidence attached to Johnson's motion
for reconsideration was relevant, because Johnson presented no justification for why her
own declaration and photographs taken by her expert years before (which were arguably
subject to Gold's motion to compel discovery previously granted) could not have been
disclosed previously, it was not error for the court to find that it was not "newly
discovered" and inadmissible.
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The court's determination that this evidence was inadmissible due to Johnson's
failure to act with reasonable diligence before summary judgment was granted is
supported by the record. Accordingly, the district court properly exercised its discretion
in denying Johnson's motion for reconsideration and in refusing to receive additional
evidence, never previously disclosed, as irrelevant and inadmissible.
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
CONSIDER JOHNSON'S UNTIMELY-RAISED OBJECTION TO REASSIGNMENT FROM
PROVO TO AMERICAN FORK.

Even if the contention had merit, by failing to object when Judge Howard recused
himself and the case was reassigned to American Fork from Provo until after summary
judgment was entered, Johnson waived any objection. '"[A]s a general rule, claims not
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.'" State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ^f
9, {quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 7 4 4 11, 10 P.3d 346). Two policy considerations
underlie the preservation rule. First, the rule exists "to give the trial court an opportunity
to 'address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it.'" Id. 110. Second, requiring
preservation of an issue prevents a party from avoiding the issue for strategic reasons
only to raise the issue on appeal if the strategy fails. Id. Tf 10.
Johnson first asserted her change of venue challenge in her motion for
reconsideration. The district court refused to hear the argument because summary
judgment had already been decided and it determined that she had waived the argument
by not raising it before. Because Johnson did not raise the issue at any time prior to the
granting of summary judgment, the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to
address the issue having determined that she had abandoned it. In other words, by not
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allowing the trial judge an adequate opportunity to consider the issue prior to summary
judgment, Johnson waived the right to raise the issue on appeal. Johnson had a fair
opportunity to raise and have the reassignment issue determined, but elected not to do so.
Johnson's election to proceed following the reassignment is conclusive.
Even if Johnson had not waived any opposition by continuing to litigate the matter
in American Fork, as summarily stated by the district court, Johnson's "challenge to
venue in the American Fork department is meritless" as "American Fork is in the same
county as Provo." (R. 720).
RELIEF SOUGHT
For the reasons set forth above, appellees respectfully request the Court to affirm the
judgment of the district court and awarded appellees their attorneys fees incurred in this
appeal based upon Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ;&?«/ day of July, 2008.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

( Scott T. Evans
Heather L. Thuet
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

44

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the Z~S> day of July, 2008, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
S. Austin Johnson
Johnson Law Associates
345 B East University Parkway
Orem, Utah 84058
Attorneys for Appellant

\
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Scott T. Wans
Heather L. Thuet
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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EXHIBIT A

S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179)
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES
345-B East University Parkway
Orem, Utah 84058
Tel: (801)426-7900
Fax:(801)805-4815
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION STATE OF UTAH

])
>
;

NELDA P. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

)
)
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT *
COMPANY
;)
Defendant.
]

AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
Nate Loftin

vs.

Case No:

0504001206 PI

Judge: Fred D. Howard

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson will take the deposition of the
defendant Nate Loftin on Thursday. February 01, 2006, beginning at 11:00 a.m. at the office of
Johnson Law Associates, 345-B East University Parkway, Orem, Utah. Said deposition will be taken
before a certified court reporter.
Dated this j? ^

day of January, 2007.

JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES

S. Austin Johnson
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson

JAN 3 1 2007

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this ffi day of January, 2007, a true and correct copy of this Notice of
Taking deposition of Head of Gold Gym was mailed, postage prepaid. To the following:

Scott T. Evans
Heather L. Thuet
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 S. Main Street, Ste 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Depomax Reporting Service
333 S. Rio Grande
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

}Jj*BM^

S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179)
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES
345-B East University Parkway
Orem, Utah 84058
Tel: (801)426-7900
Fax:(801)805-4815
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,

AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION:
Candy Negrette

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No:
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY
Defendant.

0504001206 PI

Judge: Fred D. Howard

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson will take the deposition of the
defendant Candy Negrette on Thursday, February 01, 2007, beginning at 12:00 p.m. at the office of
Johnson Law Associates, 345-B East University Parkway, Orem, Utah. Said deposition will be taken
before a certified court reporter.
Dated this

'? & day of January, 2007.

JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES
/ ) ,

4^Wl(
/3
S. Austin Johnson /
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this $0 day of January. 2007, a true and correct copy of this Notice of
Taking deposition of Head of Gold Gym was mailed, postage prepaid to the following:

Scott T. Evans
Heather L. Thuet
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 S. Main Street, Ste 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Depomax Reporting Service
333 S. Rio Grande
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179)
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES
345-B East University Parkway
Orem, Utah 84058
Tel: (801)426-7900
Fax:(801)805-4815
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,

])
1
;

Plaintiff,

]
)
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT '
COMPANY
)
Defendant.
]

AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
Lynette Felsted

vs.

Case No:

0504001206 PI

Judge: Fred D. Howard

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Nelda P. Jolinson will take the deposition of the
defendant Lisa Felsted on Thursday, February 01, 2007, beginning at 2:30 p.m. at the office of
Johnson Law Associates, 345-B East University Parkway. Orem, Utah. Said deposition will be taken
before a certified court reporter.
Dated this ^O

day of January, 2007.

JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES

S. Austin Jolinson /
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this j>Q day of January, 2007, a true and correct copy of this Notice of
Taking deposition of Head of Gold Gym was mailed, postage prepaid to the following:

Scott T. Evans
Heather L. Thuet
CHRJSTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 S. Main Street, Ste 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Depomax Reporting Service
333 S. Rio Grande
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179)
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES
345-B East University Parkway
Orem, Utah 84058
Tel: (801)426-7900
Fax:(801)805-4815
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON.
Plaintiff,

;
)
;

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
)
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY
)
Defendant.
]

Case No:

0504001206 PI

Judge: Fred D. Howard

COMES NOW S. Austm Johnson, attorney for Plaintiff, and hereby certifies that on the 30
day of January, 2007, Amended Notice of Deposition of Nate Loftin, Candy Negrette, and Lynette
Felsted, as well as a true and correct copy of thit. Certificate were sent via fax , email and mailed.
postage prepaid to the following:
Scott T. Evans
Heather L. Thuet
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. P.C.
50 S. Main Street. Ste 1500
Salt LaKe City. UT 84144
Depomax Reporting Service
333 S. Rio Grande
Salt Lake Ctv. UT 84101

*v* * i 2N1

Dated this J6

day of January 2007.
JOHNS LAW ASS<3t5IAT,ES

S. Austin Johnson"
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this day $Q of January, 2007, a true and correct copy of this certificate
of service was sent to the following:
Scott T. Evans
Heather L. Thuet
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. P.C.
50 S. Main Street. Ste 1500
Salt Lake City. UT 84144
Depomax Reporting Service
333 S. Rio Grande
Salt Lake City, UT
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EXHIBIT B

S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179)
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES
345-B East University Parkway
Orem, Utah 84058
Tel: (801)426-7900
Fax:(801)805-4815
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK, STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,

;)
)
]

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
of Lynn Richard Tregeagle

Case No: 070102050

N

GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY
)i
Defendants.
)i

Judge: David N. Mortensen
Division 11

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson will take the deposition of the
defendant Lynn Richard Tregeagle on Monday, June 11, 2007, beginning at 9:30 a.m. at the La
Quinta Inn, Conference Room # 106,521 W. University Parkway, Orem, UT 84058. Said deposition
will be taken before a certified court reporter from Depomax.
Dated this

[

day of June, 2007.

JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES

vS ftwthn Johnson IB
S. Austin Johnson
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson

JUH

- 8 200?

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this *~l day of June, 2007, a true and correct copy of this Amended
Notice of Deposition of Lynn Tregeagle was mailed, postage prepaid and via email to the
following:

Scott T. Evans
Heather L. Thuet
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Depomax Reporting Service
333 S. Rio Grande
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179)
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES
345-B East University Parkway
Orem, Utah 84058
Tel: (801)426-7900
Fax: (801) 805-4815
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK, STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,

;)

Plaintiff,

]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
)
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT '
COMPANY
)
Defendants.
])

Case No: 070102050
Judge: David N. Mortensen
Division 11

COMES NOW S. Austin Johnson, attorney for Plaintiff, and hereby certifies that on the 7th day of
June, 2007, Amended Notice of Deposition of Lynn Richard Tregeagle, as well as a true and correct
copy of this Certificate were sent by prepaid U.S postage from Orem, UT to the following:
Heather L. Thuet
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Dated this

'

day of June, 2007.
JOHNS LAW ASSOCIATES

S. Austin Johnson
Attorney for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT C

Scott T.Evans, USB #6218
Heather L. Thuet, USB #10106
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)323.5000
Facsimile: (801)323.9037
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
TO PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff,
v.
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY,

Case No.: 0504001206 PI
Judge: Fred D. Howard

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 36(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants, by and through
their counsel of record, hereby submits the following Requests for Admission, to the plaintiff, to be
answered in writing and under oath within 30 days of the date of service hereof. PLEASE TAKE
NOTICE THAT ALL MATTERS IN THESE REQUESTS SHALL BE DEEMED ADMITTED
PURSUANT TO RULE 36 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE UNLESS A
RESPONSE IS SUBMITTED WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THIS REQUEST.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that you applied for membership with Gold's Gym on
7/7/04.

REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that in applying for membership with Gold's Gym you
were provided with and executed the "Membership Agreement" page 1 of 2 attached hereto as
Exhibit "A" on 7/7/04.
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that your membership with Gold's Gym began on 7/7/04.
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that the document titled "Assumption of Risk and Risk of
Accident" page 2 of 2 attached hereto as Exhibit "B" was printed on the reverse side of
"Membership Agreement" page 1 of 2.
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that the attached "Membership Agreement" page
1 of 2 (at about the middle of the page under Notice) contains your signature.
REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that you signed the attached "Membership
Agreement" page 1 of 2 (at about the middle of the page under Notice).
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that by signing the attached document titled
""Membership Agreement" page 1 of 2 you represented you had read the document and agreed to
the terms and conditions contained therein.
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that by signing the attached document titled "Assumption
of Risk and Risk of Accident" page 2 of 2 you represented you had read the document and agreed to
the terms and conditions contained therein.
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that you signed the attached document titled
"Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident" page 2 of 2 on July 7, 2004.
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that the attached document titled "Assumption of Risk
and Risk of Accident" page 2 of 2 contains your signature twice.

REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that signing the attached documents titled
"Membership Agreement" page 1 of 2 and "Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident" page
2 of 2 was a prerequisite to joining Gold's Gym.
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that the top portion of the attached "Membership
Agreement" page 1 of 2 (Buyer's Name, Buyer's Mailing Address, Buyer's Employer.
Occupation, How long on job, Work Phone, Driver's License, In case of emergency,
Relationship to member, Address, Phone) was completed by you.
REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that the attached "Membership Agreement" page
1 of 2 was completed on 7/7/04.
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that you requested that four additional
membership cards be issued under your membership to the following individuals: (1) S.
Austin Johnson; (2) S. Andrew Johnson; (3) Justin Vance; and (4) Jeremy Pittard.
REQUEST NO. 15: Admit that pursuant to the attached "Membership
Agreement" page 1 of 2, you agreed to make 23 payments of $79.69.
REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that under the attached document titled
Membership Agreement" page 1 of 2 your membership began on 7/7/04 and renewed on
7/7/06.
REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that you did not complete, sign and deliver a written
incident report regarding your alleged fall within 72 hours of July 12, 2004 to Gold's Gym.
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that the attached document titled Membership
Agreement" page 1 of 2 and "Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident" page 2 of 2 both
contain a provision providing that the Member can cancel the contract within 3 business
days.

REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that you renewed your membership with Gold's
Gym on 6/8/06 for a term of two years beginning on 7/7/06 and renewing on 7/7/08.
DATED this 5 ^ ^ day of January, 2007
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Scott T. Evans
Heather L. Thuet
Attorneys for Defendants
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Scott T.Evans, USB #6218
Heather L. Thuet, USB #10106
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 323.5000
Facsimile: (801)323.9037
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY,
Defendants.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
OF FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION TO PLAINTIFF
Case No.: 0504001206 PI

Judge: Fred D. Howard

The Court is hereby notified that DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION TO PLAINTIFF and this CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE were submitted by
defendant(s) through its attorneys of record, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
on this _^_"day of January, 2007 by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to the following:

S. Austin Johnson
Johnson Law Firm, P.C.
345B East University Parkway
Orem, Utah 84058

Oft&b*

A
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EXHIBIT D

Scott T Evans, USB #6218
Heather L Thuet. USB # 1010c
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. P C
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone (801) 323.5000
Facsimile (801)323 9037
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,
DEFENDANT GOLD GYM'S RESPONSE
TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff,
v.
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY,
Defendants.

Case No/ 0504001206 PI
Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendant, Gold's Gym, pursuant to Rules 26, 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, hereby responds to plaintiffs interrogatories and requests for production
of documents as follows:
GENERAL OBJECTIONS
1.

Gold's Gym objects to the definitions propounded by Plaintiff to the

extent they conflict with or impose a greater burden upon Gold's Gym than would
otherwise be imposed by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and associated
discovery rules.
2.

This case is in its infancy and many of the interrogatories and requests for

production seek information pertaining to the identity of witnesses to be called at trial or

the identification of documents and other tangible things to be used as exhibits at trial It
is premature to be requesting such information and Gold's Gym reserves the nght to
supplement its responses to such interrogatories and request for production of documents
as discovery continues
3.

Some of the interrogatories and request for production of documents are

so broad in scope they invade the attorney/client and attorney work product pnvileges
and, accordingly, Gold's Gym objects to them
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Give the following information concerning the

person's full name, telephone number address [sic], and position with the company who
provided any information m answenng these interrogators or in producing any
documents in response to the Request for Production of Documents
RESPONSE: Troy Peterson, Vice President of Gold's Gym, and IMandy
Bynum, Executive Assistant for Gold's Gym of Utah,
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

State the names and addresses of all persons

known or believed by the Defendant to have paved, patched, or repaired the sidewalk or
parking lot of the premises at the Gold's Gym property m Provo where the accident took
place
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and
overly broad. It is not reasonably limited in scope, subject matter or
reasonable timeframe. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Gold's
Gym is in the process of attempting to locate documents responsive to this
request and will provide such documents when they are found*
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INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Describe, in detail, everything action taken by-

Defendant to improve safety for their customer's and pedestnans on defendant's premises
before and after the Plaintiff was injured.
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or
reasonable timeframe. Moreover, Interrogatory No. 3 is not likely to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

Describe any preventive maintenance,

evaluation and engineering provided by defendant to make sure its properties are safe for
business invites at all of its different locations; and the location where the accident
happened in Provo, UT.
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or
reasonable timeframe.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

Describe specifically, and in detail any warning,

signs, paint, or devise that warns patrons to be careful of the deep cracks in the pavement
in the parking lot at Gold's Gym where the accident occurred. Describe in detail what
you have done to repair the pavement, to determine whether it creates a risk of hazard to
patrons, or to determine whether the pavement in its condition at the time of the accident
was safe and not in need of repair.
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym denies that there were any "deep cracks" in the
pavement in the parking lot at 470 N. 900 E. in Provo, Utah. Gold's Gym further
asserts that even if such "deep cracks" existed, it denies that such cracks created a
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dangerous condition or were hidden from view. Accordingly, no warning signs or
warnings to patrons were needed.
See Response to Interrogatory No. 7, 8,10,11, and Request for Production of
Documents No. 1 and 4.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Did defendant observe the alleged condition at

any time poor to the time plaintiff was injured? If so, when did defendant first observe
said conditions?
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym is unable to formulate a response to Interrogatory
No. 6 because the question is so vague and ambiguous. Plaintiff cannot even
identify or specifically describe what condition she alleges caused her to trip.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Please identify any of defendant's discoverable

information regarding the maintenance and repair's of the premise where the accident
took place
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or
reasonable timeframe. Subject to and without waiving this objection, see
Gold's Gym's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures and Response to Interrogatory No.
2.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Identify any individuals who, according to your

knowledge or belief, may have relevant discoverable information on the maintenance and
repairs of the premise where accident took place, and on the company-wide maintenance
program for premises, parking lots, approaches and sidewalks
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RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or
reasonable timeframe. Subject to and without waiving this objection, see
Gold's Gym's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures and Response to Interrogatory No.
2. Additionally, the manager of Gold's Gym Provo, Candy Negrette and the
head of maintenance, Nate Loftin may have relevant discoverable
information on the maintenance and repairs of the parking lot at 470 N. 900
E. in Provo, Utah.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

Descnbe any reports of accidents, tripping of

persons, or slip and falls that have occurred m the parking lot at Gold's Gym in Provo
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this as it is not reasonably limited in
scope, subject matter, location or time. Moreover, Interrogatory No. 9 is not likely
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and without waiving this
objection Gold's Gym responds as follows: aside from plaintiff, there have been two
reports of accidents, tripping or slip and falls that may have occurred in the Gold's
Gym parking lot located at 470 N. 900 E. in Provo, Utah. On 9/17/97 an individual
claimed to have tripped on a rug outside of gym and on 6/9/99 an individual claimed
to have sprained his ankle, although it is unknown if the injury was claimed to have
occurred in the parking lot or in the facility.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State the name and the address of every
maintenance provider or any other person with whom you have worked on the pavement
or repairs to the premise entry and parking lot for the five years preceding the incident
Descnbe what was done to improve and fix the entry, sidewalk, and parking lot pavement
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for the secunty of the patrons In so doing, provide the dates and reasons for each work
done
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or
reasonable timeframe. Subject to and without waiving this objection, see
Gold's Gym's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures and Response to Interrogatory No.
2.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please state each expense incurred by you in
fixing the crack or hazards that cause any prior incident, the purpose for which the
expense was incurred, and to whom it was paid
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or
reasonable timeframe. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Gold's
Gym's denies fixing any "crack hazard that caused any prior incident" in
Gold's Gym parking lot located at 470 N. 900 E. in Provo, Utah.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: If you are going to call any expert witness, set
forth the areas of their expertise, identify any facts provided to assist them as a part of
their basis for their opinions, and, provide a summary of the experts opinions as they
relate to this case
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym has not yet determined whether it will call an
expert to testify on it's behalf at the trial of this matter nor, if so, the identity
of any such expert.

The requested information will be provided in

accordance with the scheduling order entered by the court.
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INTERROGATORY NO, 13: If you are going to call any fact witnesses, set
forth the areas of their personal observation, knowledge or information that make them
able to testify and describe their full opinion that may be offered at trial.
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this request as premature, as it has not
yet determined which, if any, of the persons identified in Defendant's Rule 26
Initial Disclosures or those persons it has deposed it will call to testily at trial.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify each location owned by Peay
Investment Company within or without the state of Utah, the number of patrons each
location accommodates; and identify any employee, contractor or manager who is in
charge of providing a safe place for the patrons at each location.
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or
reasonable timeframe* Moreover, Interrogatory No. 14 is not likely to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence and appears to be intended to harass
and/or unreasonably increase the costs of litigation. Subject to and without
waiving this objection, see attached Club Usage Reports from 10/18/2004.
The manager of Gold's Gym Provo is Candy Negrette. Nate Loftin is the
head of maintenance.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1;

Produce each and every repair bill

related to the entry, sidewalk and parking lot pavement at the Gold's Gym in Provo, UT,
that has been incurred in the past seven years.

7

RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as reasonably limited in
time. Moreover, Request for Production No. 1 appears to be intended to
harass and/or unreasonably increase the costs of litigation. Subject to and
without waiving this objection, see Response to Interrogatory No. 2.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Provide a copy of each photograph,

receipt, and bill which identifies any work done on the premise where accident occurred.
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and
overly broad. It is not reasonably limited in scope, subject matter, location
or timeframe. Moreover, Interrogatory No. 14 is not likely to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence and appears to be intended to harass and/or
unreasonably increase the costs of litigation. Gold's Gym also objects to
Request for Production No. 2 to the extent that it calls for the disclosure of
information protected by the attorney/client and attorney work/product
privileges. Subject to and without waiving this objection, see Response to
Interrogatory No. 2.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Produce for inspection and copying all

repair and improvement reports and/or records relating to this accident.
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to Request for Production No. 4 on the
grounds that it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Gold's Gym also
objects to Request for Production No. 4 to the extent that it calls for the
disclosure of information protected by the attorney/client and attorney
work/product privileges. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing
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objections, Gold's Gym is unable to formulate a response to Request for
Production No. 4 because plaintiff cannot even identify or specifically
describe what condition she alleges caused her to trip.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

Produce for inspection and copying

ANY DOCUMENT that may relate to, refer to, or constitute your answer to any
interrogatory served on defendant simultaneously with these reports
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to Request for Production No. 5 on the
grounds that it is unintelligible. No reports were served on defendant
simultaneously with any interrogatory. Gold's Gym also objects to Request
for Production No. 5 to the extent that it calls for the disclosure of
information protected by the attorney/client and attorney work/product
privileges. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see
Response to Interrogatory No. 2.

DATED this z?"22 day of January, 2007
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P C

ScbttT EySns
Heather L Thuet
Attorneys for Defendant
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF

\.
)

COUNTY OF ^LL\ZLU
'^vl
^

ss:

)
_ being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that

he/she is authorized to execute this document on behalf of Gold's Gym. in the aboveentitled matter, that he/she has read the foregoing Response to Plaintiffs First Set of
Interrogatones and Request for Production of Documents and that to the best of his/her
knowledge, information and belief, he/she believes them to be true

DATED this \ 1 day of N J A ^ U a ^

, 20Qg- ^(2JfeT

%

Subscnbed and sworn to before me this j ( day of - 0 &M**-o~>\ru
, 2QQ&-•or/it
2- oo
^

llg'Llii'l'lili 1 i»imnw

Notary pii&ijc
Staft of Ittate
My Commission Bxptm Oct 31,2009
tj»9 South 800 EastOram UrtS403?
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LEASE

THIS LEASE is made and entered into this J r J day of

p ^ / y u ^ y , 1995 by and

between Peay Investment Corp., a Utah corporation ("Landlord") and Body Firm Aerobics, Inc.,
a Utah Corporation ("Tenant").
WITNESSETH:
1. PREMISES
1.1 Landlord hereby leases to Tenant all of those certain premises, including the
building, structures, appurtenant parking lot and access and other improvements owned by
Landlord now or hereafter located thereon together with the rights and appurtenances thereof,
situated at ^10 North 900 East, Provo, Utah County, State of Utah, as more particularly
described in "Exhibit "A" which exhibit is attached hereto and made a part hereof by reference
(hereinafter referred to as the "Premises").
L2 Landlord, shall promptly commence and shall pursue with due diligence until
completion, the improvement of the building and related structures and facilities, except floor
coverings, to be constructed by Landlord and as more fully set forth on the plans and
specifications attached hereto as Exhibits B-l and B-2, or such revisions, amendments or
modifications thereto as shall be approved by Tenant, which approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld (hereinafter referred to as the "Construction"). That portion of the Construction as is
described on Exhibit B-l shall be performed by Landlord at Landlord's cost and expense. That
portion of the Construction as is described on Exhibit B-2 shall be performed by Landlord at
Tenant's cost and expense. The Construction shall use first class materials and shall be made
and performed in a good and workmanlike manner and in accordance with all applicable laws,
statutes, ordinances and building codes.
1.3

—.

It is acknowledged by the parties that the (^syW3l^>n to be performed by

Landlord is in the approximate amount of^te^Hundred Fifty Thou^lduDollars ($150,000.00).
This lease is contingent on Landlord securing financing acceptable to Landlord lor the costs of
such Construction.

Within thirty <1U| days of the execution of this 1 ease by Landlord and

Tenant, Landlord shall make application for such financing and shall proceed with reasonable
due diligence to complete the same.
1.4

Landlord shall notify Tenant of the approximate date upon which the

Construction will be Substantially Completed which date shall be on or before August 1, 1995.
Landlord shall promptly notify Tenant of any subsequent changes to such date as soon as
Landlord becomes aware of it. The date upon which the Construction is Substantially Completed
shall be the "Premises Completion Date"; provided that if Substantial Completion is delayed
because of any delay by Tenant, the Premises Completion Date shall be deemed to occur on the
date when it would have occurred had there been no such delay by Tenant. The words
"Substantially Completed" shall mean the date when:
(a) The Construction has been completed (except for Punch List Items)
in accordance with the plans and specifications; and
(b) Landlord has obtained a certificate of occupancy permitting Tenant's
use and enjoyment of the Premises for the purposes authorized by the Lease.
1.5

Within ten (10) days after the Premises Completion Date, Landlord shall

deliver to Tenant for Tenant's approval a current list ("Punch List1') of Punch List Items for the
Premises that Landlord is obligated by the provisions of this Lease to complete. Within ten (10)
days after receipt of the Punch List, Tenant shall notify Landlord of any additional Punch List
Items which it requests Landlord to perform. Punch List Items, including such items requested
by Tenant as Landlord agrees to perform, shall be completed by Landlord within (30) days after
the Premises Completion Date. If Landlord has obtained a temporary certificate of occupancy
Landlord shall, with due diligence, complete the remaining items of construction required to
obtain, and shall thereupon obtain, a permanent certificate of occupancy for the Premises as
required by law. The words "Punch List Items" shall mean details of construction, decoration,
and mechanical and electrical adjustments which, in the aggregate, are minor in character and
do not materially interfere with Tenant's use or enjoyment of the Premises in accordance with
the provisions of this Lease.
1.6 On the date upon which the Construction is Substantially completed, or such
date prior thereto as Landlord shall consent, Tenant shall, at Tenant's cost, promptly commence
and shall pursue with due diligence until completion to install or have installed the floor
coverings and to otherwise prepare the Premises in accordance with Exhibit C (hereinafter

referred to as the "Tenant's Work"). Prior to installation, leuauf slwll submit h» i^udloid for
Landlord's approval, plans for and samples of the floor coverings to be installed by Tenant. If
Landlord shall consent to the commencement of Tenants Work prior to the date of Substantial
Completion of the Construction, Tenant's Work shall be performed at such time and in such
manner as shall not delay the Construction. The Tenant's Work shall use first class materials
and shall be performed in a good and workmanlike manner and in accordance with all applicable
laws, statutes, ordinances and building codes.
1.7 Unless requested by Landlord, as provided in Section 7 1, the Construction,
including the Construction described on Exhibit B-2, and the Tenant's Work shall not be
removed by Tenant at the expiration or earlier termination of the Term of this Lease, but such
(instruction and Tenant's Work shall belong to Landlord without compensation to Tenant.
2.

LANDLORD'S TITLE
2.1 Landlord represents and warrants that it is well seized of and has good and

marketable title to the Premises in fee simple.

Landlord agrees to defend said title and

represents and warrants that, so long as Tenant fulfills the covenants and conditions of this Lease
required by it to be kept and performed, Tenant shall have, throughout the entire term and any
extension thereof, peaceful and quiet possession and enjoyment of the Premises.

Landlord

further represents and warrants that it has good right, full power and lawful authority to make
this Lease for the term herein specified and any extension thereof.
3.

TERM
3.1 The Premises are leased for a term (the "Term") winch shall commence on

the date of execution hereof and shall end on the date which is thirty HO) years after the
Commencement Date (hereinafter defined). For purposes of this Lease the term "Expiration
Date" shall mean the date wliich is thirty (30) years followmg the Commencement Date, or such
earlier date on which this Lease terminates pursuant to the terms hereof. Promptly following
the Commencement Date, Landlord and Tenant shall execute a written instrument which shall
stt forth the Commencement Dale and Expiration Date of die Term of this Lease.
4

RFNi

4.1 Tenant's obligation to pay rent shall begin on the earlier of (aj the first day
after (i) the Premises Completion Date and (ii) the dale ihat i .mdlord deln en possession to the
3

Tenant or (b) August 1, 1995 (the "Commencement Date"). From and after the Commencement
Date, rental payments shall be due on thefirstday of each month during the Term of this Lease.
The amount of the monthly rental payments, subject to adjustment as hereinafter provided, shall
be Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00). If the Commencement Date should occur
on a day other than the first day of a calendar month, or the Expiration Date should occur on
a day other than the last day of a calendar month, then the rental for such fractional month shall
be prorated upon a daily basis based upon a thirty (30) day calendar month.
4.2 On thefifthanniversary of the Commencement Date and on each anniversary
of the Commencement Date thereafter during the Term the monthly rent shall be adjusted. The
adjusted monthly rent shall be determined by multiplying the monthly rent due for the year prior
to the^niyersary date by One Hundred Three percent (103%),
4.2,1 Landlord shall send Tenant a Rent Adjustment Statement setting
forth the determination of the adjustment in the monthly rent. Until such time as Tenant has
received such statement, Tenant shall continue to pay the monthly rent previously required
hereunder. The increase in the monthly rent during die period of time prior to receipt of such
Rent Adjustment Statement shall be paid by Tenant to Landlord upon receipt of such statement.
4.3 If any installment of rent or any other sum due from the Tenant shall not be
received by the Landlord or the Landlord's designee within Five (5) days after such amount shall
be due, Tenant shall pay to Landlord a late charge equal tofciftyDollars ($50.00) per day until
said payment and late charges are received. The parties hereby agree that such late charge
represents a fair and reasonable estimate of the costs that the Landlord will incur by reason of
late payment by the Tenant- In addition such late payment shall bear interest at the rate of
eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the due date thereof.
5. RENT AND SECURITY DEPOSIT
5.1 Upon execution of this Lease Agreement by Landlord and Tenant, Tenant
shall deposit with Landlord the sum of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) which
is the first month rent under the provisions of Section 4.1.
5.2

As security for the faithful performance of the terms, covenants and

conditions of this Lease, Tenant shall deposit with Landlord, upon execution of this Lease
Agreement, an additional sum of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00). In the
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4.3 If any installment of rent or any other sum due from the Tenant shall not be
received by the Landlord or the Landlord's designee within five (5) days after such amount shall
be due, Tenant shall pay to Landlord a late charge equal to tnfty Dollars ($50.00) per day until
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RENT AND SECURITY DEPOSIT
5.1 Upon execution of this Lease Agreement by Landlord and Tenant, Tenant

shall deposit with Landlord the sum of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) which
is the first month rent under the provisions of Section 4.1.
5.2

As security (or ihe faithful performance ol the tains, covenants and

conditions of this Lease, Tenant shall deposit with Landlord, upon execution of this Lease
Agreement, an additional sum of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00). In the
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event Tenant shall default in the performance of any term or provision of this Lease, Landlord
may use or apply such security to the payment of any rent of Tenant, any sums which Landlord
may expend or be required to expend as a result of Tenant's default or for any damages of
Tenant as a result of Tenant's default. No such use or application of the security shall be
deemed to cure the Tenant's default, but Tenant shall be deemed in default until Tenant shall
have cured the default and/or replaced the security deposit. In the event Tenant shall not default
in the performance of this Lease, then the security deposit shall be returned to Tenant, without
interest, after the expiration of the Lease and re-delivery of the Premises to Landlord.
6. USE OF THE PREMISES
6.1 Tenant shall use the Premises for the purpose of conducting the business of
aerobics, weight and fitness training and classes, selling merchandise, tanning salon, day care
and juice bar. Tenant shall not use or allow the Premises to be used for any other purpose
without the prior written consent of Landlord, which consent shall not unreasonably be withheld,
nor in any event shall Tenant use or allow the Premises to be used for any unlawful purpose.
6.2 Tenant shall comply with all laws, ordinances and regulations of any federal,
state, county, municipal or other lawful authority in connection with its occupancy of the
Premises and all rules relating to alteration, improvement or development of the Premises.
7. IMPROVEMENTS AND ALTERATIONS AND SIGNS
7.1 Tenant shall not improve, alter or modify the Premises in any manner without
the prior written consent of Landlord, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Prior
to seeking such approval, Tenant shall submit to Landlord written plans and specifications
including the plan for financing of any such improvements and alterations. If Landlord shall
consent to any improvements or alterations, Tenant shall promptly commence and shall pursue
with due diligence to completion the making of such improvements or alterations. Tenant's
improvements or alternations shall use first class materials and shall be made and performed in
a workmanlike manner and in compliance with all federal, state and municipal laws and
regulations. All improvements or alterations erected, installed, or made by Tenant including the
Tenant's Work shall become part of the Premises and, upon expiration or sooner termination of
this Lease shall belong to Landlord without compensation to Tenant. If Landlord shall require
the removal of any improvements, alterations or the Tenant's Work, Tenant shall repair all
damages to the Premises caused by such removal. The consent of the Landlord to make
5

improvements, alterations or Tenant's Work shall not be construed as an authorization to Tenant
that the Tenant make improvements, alterations or Tenant's Work on behalf of the Landlord and
no lien or encumbrance arising out of the said improvements, alterations or Tenant's Work shall
constitute a lien or encumbrance on the interest of the Landlord in the Premises. Tenant agrees
not to permit any lien or encumbrance for monies owing by Tenant whetfier from the
improvements, alteradons, Tenant's Work or otherwise, to remain against the Tenant's interest
in the Premises for a period of more than thirty (30) days.
7.2 Tenant may place suitable signs on die Premises lor the purpose oi indicating
Hit natmc uj the business carried on by the Tenant in said Premises; provided, however, that
such signs and their location shall be in keeping with other signs in the district where die
Premises are located, shall conform with any Provo City Sign Code and shall be approved in
advance by Landlord. Damage to Uie Premises caused by the removal of such signs at die
termination of this Lease shall be repaired by Tenant.
7.3 Tenant shall be responsible for any alteration, repair or improvement to the
Premises required by ordinance, regulation or requirement of any governmental agency, which
is effective or becomes effective during the Term of this Lease.
8. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS
8.1

At Landlord's sole cost and expense, Landlord shall keep and maintain the

roof and roof structure in good order, condition and repair' normal wear and use excepted.
8.2

At Tenant's sole cost and expense, Tenant shall keep and maintain the

Premises and all improvements thereon including the exterior, parking lot, plumbing, sewer,
electrical, heating and air conditioning systems in good order, condition and repair, normal wear
and use excepted. Tenant shall comply with all public laws, ordinances and regulations from
time to time applicable to the Premises. Tenant hereby waives any provision of law that it may
make repairs at the expense of Landlord. At the end of the Term of this Lease Tenant shall
return possession of the Premises to Landlord in good order, condition and repair.
9, FORCE MAJEURE
J. 1 In the event either party is unable practicably to make or complete any repair,
alteration or maintenance required of such party hereunder because of difficulty in obtaining
labor or materials, or because of any law or regulation, labor dispute, or any otiier cause beyond
such party's control, such party shall not, as a result thereof, be in breach of any such duty
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hereunder, and shall not be liable to the other party for any damages resulting therefrom, in any
such event, the time limit for the performance of any such duty shall be extended for a period
which is reasonable in light of such delay. Except as provided in Section 15.4, Tenant shall pay
the rent required under this Lease during any such period of delay.
10. UTILITIES
10.1 From and after the Commencement Date Tenant shall pay all charges for
water, gas, heat, electricity, power, telephone service and all other utilities used in, upon or
about the Premises.
11. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS
11.1 Tenant shall pay all real and personal property taxes, assessments and other
charges levied or assessed against the Premises and its contents for any period all of which is
included within the Term, and also its prorata share of all such taxes, assessments and other
charges levied or assessed thereon for any period, part of which is included within the Term.
11.2 Tenant shall have the right at Tenant's sole cost and expense to contest the
legality or validity of any taxes, assessments or other public charges which are to be paid by
Tenant hereunder, however, notwithstanding such contest, Tenant shall continue to pay to
Landlord the monthly payment of such tax assessments or other charges as provided in Section
13.2* Uponfinaldetermination of such contest, the amount necessary to discharge any judgment
or decision rendered against Tenant, together with all costs and charges incidental thereto, shall
be paid by Tenant. Such portion of such taxes as shall have been deposited with Landlord under
the provisions of this section shall be paid by Landlord from such deposits. Landlord shall, at
the request of Tenant, execute, or join in the execution of any instrument or document necessary
in connection with any such contest. Tenant shall indemnify and hold Landlord harmless against
and from any liability resulting from Tenant having contested any such tax, assessment or other
charge.
12. INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY
12.1 Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, Tenant shall indemnify and
hold Landlord harmless against and from any loss, damage or injury to the Premises or to any
person at any time occasioned by or arising out of (a) any act, activity or omission of Tenant
or of any of its employees; or (b) the occupancy or use of the Premises or any part thereof by
or under Tenant and any condition existing at or upon the Premises.
7

12.2 Landlord shall, at Tenant's sole cost and expense, keep or cause to be kept
the building and structures upon the Premises insured by an insurance carrier licensed to do
business in the State of Utah, *uid rated A: AAA or better by Best's Insurance Guide, against loss
or damage by tire, flood and such other casualties as are normally included in a Cause of Loss Broad Form Insurance Policy, including vandalism and malicious mischief, in an amount not less
than the lull replacement cost of the building (which is determined at this time to be Six
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($600,000.00)) and covering both single and multiple occurrences,
and including an endorsement for Landlord's loss of rent or business income loss in an amount
at least equal to the rent payable hereunder. Landlord may re-evaluate the value of the Premises
and improvements and request a reasonable increase in the coverage afforded hereunder. Any
such insurance policy shall provide that the proceeds thereof shall be payable to Landlord to be
held and used by Landlord for reconstruction of the Premises as hereinafter provided, or in the
case of payment under a rent loss or business income loss endorsement to pay or apply the same
to the rent due to the Landlord hereunder.
12.3 Tenant shall, at Tenant's sole cost and expense, keep or cause to be kept
its equipment, trade fixtures, furnishings, inventory and other personal property located upon
the Premises insured by an insurance carrier licensed to do business in the State of Utah, and
rated A:AAA or better by Best's Insurance Guide, against loss or damage by fire, flood and
such other casualties as are normally included m a Cause of Loss -Broad Form Insurance Policy,
including vandalism and malicious mischief, in an amount not less than the full replacement cost
of such personal property. Any such insurance policy shall provide that the proceeds thereof
shall be the property of Landlord as its interests shall appear, including without limitation its
rights under Section 18.4.
12.4 Tenant shall maintain in full force a policy of comprehensive liability
insurance, including bodily injury and property damage, written by one or more responsible
insurance companies licensed to do business in the State of Utah and rated A: AAA or better by
Best's Insurance Guide, which will insure the parties against liability for injury to persons and/or
property and/or death of any person or persons occurring in or about the Premises. Such
comprehensive liability insurance shall afford protection to the hinii ul not less than
$1,000,000,00 in respect to bodily injury or death and/or damage to proper!) resulting from an
(single) occurrence. Every five years following the commencement date, Landlord may re-
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evaluate the insurance coverage provided hereunder and request a reasonable increase in the
coverage afforded hereunder.
12.5 Tenant shall maintain and keep in force all workmen's compensation
insurance with respect to its employees required under the laws of the State of Utah.
12.6 All policies of insurance required hereunder shall be obtained on or before
the Commencement Date and shall include Landlord, and Landlord's mortgagee, as additional
insureds as their interests may appear, and a provision that the insurer waives the right of
subrogation against Landlord, its agents, representatives and mortgagee. A certificate for each
of such policies shall be delivered to Landlord. At least thirty (30) days before the expiration
of each such policy, Tenant shall furnish Landlord with appropriate proof of the issuance of a
policy continuing in force the insurance covered by the policies so expiring.
12.7 Should Tenant fail, refuse or neglect to deposit with Landlord adequate
proof that it has caused to be insured and kept in force the insurance required and agreed herein,
Landlord shall have the right, at its option, to effect such insurance, as herein required of Tenant
including being named as additional insured and waiver of subrogation. Any premiums therefore
paid by Landlord shall be treated as additional rent which shall be due and payable with interest
at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum by Tenant on the first day of the month next
succeeding the date upon which such premiums shall be paid by Landlord.
12.8 Tenant hereby waives all claims against the Landlord for damages or losses
sustained by Tenant to equipment, trade fixtures, inventory, any personal property or otherwise,
or for injury to persons in and upon the Premises from any cause whatsoever.
13. MONTHLY DEPOSIT FOR TAXES AND INSURANCE
13.1 On the first day of each month during the Term of this Lease or any
Extended Term hereof Tenant shall pay to Landlord a sum equal to the amount of the real estate
taxes and assessments for the Premises and of any insurance premiums required to be paid to
Landlo£d_hereunder that will next become due and payable divided by the number of months to
elapse prior to one month before such taxes, assessments and insurance premiums shall become
due and payable. The amount to be payable each year shall be estimated by Landlord based
upon the amounts payable during the preceding year. Such amounts shall be held by Landlord
m tntsUo pay such taxes, assessments and msurance premiums. Interest shall not earn interest
on such deposits nor shall such deposits be payable to Tenant.
9

13.2 If at the due date for payment of any such real estate taxes and assessments
01 uwiuance premiums, the amount oa deposit with Landlord is insufficient to pay such taxes
or premium, the Tenant shall pay to Landlord the amount of such insufficiency within ten (10)
days of notification by Landlord of the amount of such insufficiency. At the end of each year
of the Term, if the amount of the real estate taxes and assessments and insurance premiums paid
exceed the amounts estimated by Landlord, and if Tenant has not previously paid such additional
amount as provided above, then Tenant shall within ten (10) days of notice by Landlord, pay
to Landlord the amount by which the real estate taxes and assessments and insurance premiums
paid exceeded the amounts estimated by Landlord. Any amount remaining on deposit with
Landlord at the end of any year of the Term, except the final year of the Term, shall continue
to be held by Landlord under the terms of this Section 13.
14

ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING.
14 1 Tenant shall not assign or sublet its rights or interests under this Lease

without the prior written consent of Landlord. However, if the assignment or subletting, shall
be of less than be of less than twenty five (25%) percent of the total area of the Building is for
less than twenty-five (25%) percent of the normal business usage hours of the Premises, Tenant
shall not be required to secure the prior written consent of Landlord, but will, if requested by
Landlord, notify Landlord of any such assignment or subletting. In the event Tenant shall at any
time assign its interest under this Lease or sublet the Premises and shall receive thereby a rental
in excess of the rent provided herein, Landlord shall be entitled to such excess rent.
15. DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION
15 1 Subject to the provisions of Section 15.3, if at any time during the Term
the Premises are destroyed or damaged and either (a) such damage is not "substantial" as that
term is hereinafter defined, or (b) such damage is covered by insurance proceeds received by
Landlord, then Landlord shall promptly repair such damage, using such insurance proceeds as
are received, and this Lease shall continue in full force and effect.

Tenant shall immediately

pay to Landlord the amount of all expenses of repair which are not covered by insurance
proceeds.
H

}

Sitbftvt to the provisions of Section 15.3, if at any time during the term

hereof the Pienuscs are destroyed or damaged, and if such damage is "substantial" as that tenn
is hereinafter defined, and if such damage was caused by a casualty not required to be insured
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against under Section 12 then Landlord may at its option either (a) repair such damage as soon
as reasonably possible at Landlord's expense, in which event this Lease shall continue in full
force and effect, or (b) cancel and terminate this Lease as of the date of the occurrence of such
damage, by giving Tenant written notice of its election to do so within sixty (60) days after the
date of occurrence of such damage. In the event such damage or destruction is caused by the
negligent or willful acts or omissions of Tenant, its agents, employees, customers or
representatives, Tenant shall immediately pay to Landlord the amount of all expenses of repair.
15.3 If the Premises are destroyed or damaged during the last twelve (12) months
of the Term of this Lease and tlie estimated cost of repair exceeds ten percent (10%) of the
monthly rent then remaining to be paid by Tenant for the balance of the Term, Landlord may
at its option cancel and terminate this Lease as of the date of occurrence of such damage by
giving Tenant written notice of its election to do so within thirty (30) days after the date of such
damage. If Landlord shall not elect to terminate this Lease, the repair of such damage shall be
governed by Section 15.1 or 15.2, as the case may be.

1

15.4 If the Premises are destroyed or damaged and Landlord repairs or restores
them pursuant to the provisions of this Section 15, Tenant shall continue the operation of its
business in the Premises to the extent reasonably practicable from the standpoint of prudent
business management; and the monthly rent payable hereunder for the period during which such
damage, repair or restoration continues (or during the periocl when Tenant cannot conduct its
business in the Premises, whichever is longer) shall be abated in proportion to the degree to
which the Premises are rendered untenantable. The provisions hereof shall not be effective to
prevent full payment of the monthly rent pursuant to the business income loss or rent loss
endorsement in effect with respect to the insurance polices. There shall be no abatement of any
type of additional rent or other monetary charge payable hereunder. Tenant shall have no claim
against Landlord for any damages suffered by Tenant by reason of any such damage,
destruction, repair or restoration.

If Landlord shall be obligated to repair or restore tlie

Premises under these provisions of this Article and shall not commence such repair or restoration
within one hundred and twenty (120) days after such obligations shall accrue (which shall be
deemed to be the date on which tlie insurance carrier acknowledges liability and Fixes the amount
payable to Landlord) Tenant may at its option cancel and terminate this Lease as of the date

ii

Tenant vacates the Premises by giving Landlord written notice of its election to do so at any
time prior to the commencement of such repair or restoration.
15.5 For the purpose of this Section 15, "substantial" damage to the Premises
shall be deemed to be damage, the estimated cost of repair of which exceeds twenty percent
(20%) of the then estimated replacement cost ot the building and improvements.

The

determination in good faith by Landlord of the estimated cost of repair of any damage and/or
the estimated replacement cost of the building shall be conclusive for the purpose hereof.
1 f\ EMINENT DOMAIN
J ft. 1 In the event all of the Premises shall be appropriated or taken under the
power of eminent domain by any public or quasi-public authority, or by reason oi a purchase
under threat thereof, this Lease shall terminate and expire as of the date of such taking.
16.2 In the event (a) any portion of the building on the Premises is taken or (b)
more than twenty percent (20%) of the area of the Premises utilized by Tenant for driveways
and parking is taken, or (c) direct access from the Premises to any adjacent public street or
highway is cut-off, under the power of eminent domain by any public or quasi-public authority,
or by reason of a purchase under threat thereof, either party shall have the right to terminate this
Lease as of the date of such taking upon giving the other party written notice of such election
within thirty (30) days after the date of written notice to such party that the Premises are to be
so appropriated or taken. Landlord shall notify Tenant of any •contemplated appropriation within
its knowledge. If neither party shall elect to so terminate this Lease, then Landlord shall, at
Landlord's cost and expense, immediately restore the Premises to a complete unit of like quality
and character as existed prior to such appropriation or taking. Rent shall be abated from the
date of any such taking to the date restoration is completed, and, thereafter, there shall be a
prorata abatement of rent based upon the extent to which the size of the Premises has been
reduced.
16.3 If this Lease is terminated in accordance with either Section 16.1 or Section
16.2, Landlord shall be entitled to the entire award or compensation in such proceedings,
including without limitation, any award made for the value of the leasehold estate or any other
rights of Tenant created or existing under this Lease. Tenant shall be entitled to (a) the portion
of the award, if any, made for the taking or appropriation of Tenant's Fixtures, furnishings,
equipment or other personal property; and (b) such sumt if an\ received by way of award or
12

negotiation to compensate Tenant for interference with its business or relocation. The rent for
the last month of Tenant's occupancy shall be prorated.
17. HOLDING OVER
17.1 Should Tenant for any reason remain in possession of the Premises, or any
part thereof, after the expiration of the Term with the consent, express or implied, of Landlord,
such holding over shall constitute a tenancy from month to month only, upon the same
conditions and at the same rental as herein set forth.
18. DEFAULT AND REMEDIES
18.1 The occurrence of any of the following shall constitute a material default and
breach of this Lease by the Tenant:
(a) Nonpayment. Any failure by the Tenant to pay when due any rent or
other monetary sums required to be paid by the Tenant hereunder;
(b) Abandonment. The abandonment or vacation of the Premises by the
Tenant;
(c) Nonobservance or Nonperformance.

A failure by the Tenant to

observe or perform any other provision of this Lease to be observed or performed by the
Tenant, if such failure continues for twenty (20) days after written notice thereof to the Tenant,
provided, however, that if the nature of the default is such that the same cannot reasonably be
cured within said twenty (20) day period, the Tenant shall not be deemed to be in default if the
Tenant shall within such period commence such cure and thereafter diligently prosecute the same
to completion;
(d) Insolvency. The making by Tenant of any general assignment or
general arrangement for the benefit of creditors; the fding by or against Tenant of a petition to
have Tenant adjudged a bankrupt or of a petition for reorganization or arrangement under any
law relating to bankruptcy (unless, in the case of a petition filed against Tenant, the same is
dismissed within thirty (30) days); the appointment of a trustee or receiver to take possession
of substantially all of the Tenant's assets located at the Premises or the Tenant's interest in this
Lease; or the attachment execution, or other judicial seizure of Tenant's assets located at the
Premises or of the Tenant's interest in this Lease.
18.2 Nonexclusive Remedies. In the event of any material default or breach by
the Tenant under this Lease, the Landlord shall have the following nonexclusive remedies:
13

(a) Continuation.

At its option and without waiving any default by the

Tenant, the Landlord shall have the right to continue this Lease in full force and effect and to
collect all rent, additional rent, and other fees to be paid by the Tenant hereunder as and when
due

I hiring any period that the I enant is in default hereunder, the Landlord shall have the

right, pursuant to legal proceedings or pursuant to any notice provided for by law, to enter and
take possession of the Premises, without terminating this Lease, for the purpose of reletting said
Premises or any part thereof and making any alterations and repairs that may be necessary or
desirable in connection with such reletting. Any such reletting or relettings may be for such
term or terms (including periods that would exceed the remaining term hereof), and at such rent
or rents, and upon such other terms and conditions as the Landlord may in its sole discretion
deem advisable. Upon each and any such reletting, the rents received by the Landlord from
such reletting shall be applied as follows: First to the payment of any indebtedness (other than
rent) due hereunder from the Tenant to the Landlord; second to payment of costs and expenses
of such reletting, including brokerage fees, attorneys' fees, court costs, and costs of any
alterations or repairs; third to the payment of rent, and other amounts due and unpaid hereunder;
and fourth, the residue, if any, shall be held by the Landlord and applied in payment of future
rent, and other amounts as the same become due and payable hereunder. If the rent or rents
received during any month and applied as provided above shall be insufficient to cover all such
amounts including the rent, and other amounts to be paid hereunder by the Tenant for such
month, the Tenant shall pay to the Landlord any such deficiency; such deficiencies shall be
calculated and applied monthly. No entry or taking possession of the Premises by the Landlord
shall be construed as an election by the Landlord to terminate this Lease, unless the Landlord
gives written notice of such election to the Tenant or unless such termination shall be decreed
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Notwithstanding any reletting by the Landlord without
termination, the Landlord may at any time thereafter terminate this Lease for such previous
default by giving written notice thereof to the Tenant.
(b) Termination. The Landlord shall have the right, at its option, to
terminate this Lease and the Tenant's right to possession hereunder by giving notice thereof to
the Tenant, in which case this Lease shall terminate and the Tenant shall immediately surrender
possession of the Premises to the Landlord. In such event the Landlord shall be entitled to
recover from the Tenant all damages incurred by the Landlord by reason of the Tenant's default,
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19. PAYMENTS AND NOTICES
19.1 All rents and other sums payable by Tenant to Landlord shall be paid at the
address provided below. Any notices to be given or other document to be delivered by either
party to the other hereunder may be deposited in the United States Mail, duly registered or
certified, with postage prepaid, and simultaneously mailed, postage prepaid in the regular United
States Mail, addressed to the party for whom intended, as follows:
To Landlord:

Peay Investment Corp.
585 East 300 South
Provo, Utah 84606

To Tenant:

Body Firm Aerobics, Inc.
4200 North 231 East
Provo, Utah 84604

Either party may, from time to time, by written notice to the other, designate a different address
which shall be substituted for the one above specified. If any notice or other document is sent
by registered or certified and regular mail, as aforesaid, the same shall be deemed served or
delivered when mailed.
20. GENERAL

'

20.1 Attorneys' Fees. In the event that any action is brought by either party
against the other for the enforcement or declaration of any rights or remedies in or under this
Lease, or for the breach of any covenant or condition of this Lease, then and in such event, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover, and the other party shall pay all fees, costs and
expenses including but not limited to attorney's fees, whether by suit or otherwise, and including
any appeals and bankruptcy proceedings,
20.2

Waiver.

No waiver of any breach of any of the terms, covenants,

agreements, restrictions or conditions of this Lease shall be construed as a waiver of any
succeeding breach of the same or other covenants, agreements, restrictions and conditions
thereof.
20.3 Surrender at the End of Term. Upon expiration of the Term, or any
extended Term thereof, or sooner termination of this Lease, Tenant shall surrender the Premises
to Landlord.
20.4 Lease Binding on Successors and Assigns. Subject to the limitations on
assignment and subleasing by Tenant, each of the terms, covenants and conditions of diis Lease
16

including without limitation the following: (i) All unpaid rent which had been earned at the
time of such termination (together with interest thereon at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per
annum to the time of award) plus (ii) the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have
been earned after termination until the time of award (together with interest thereon at the rate
of eighteen percent (18%) per annum to the time of award) exceeds the amount of such rental
loss that is proved could have been reasonably avoided; plus (iii) the worth at die time of award
of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the Term after the time of award
exceeds the amount of such rental loss that is proved could be reasonably avoided; plus (iv) any
other amount necessary to compensate the Landlord for all detriment proximately caused by the
Tenant's failure to perform its obligations under this Lease or which in the ordinary course of
tilings would be likely to result therefrom; plus (vj at the Landlord's election, such other
amounts in addition to ur in iieu oi the foregoing as may be permitted from time to time by
applicable law. Upon any such re-entry, the Landlord shall have the nght at the Tenant's
expense to make any repairs, alterations or modifications to the Premises, which the Landlord
in its discretion deems reasonable and necessary. As used in this Section, die "worth at the time
of award" is computed by discounting such amount at the discount rate of the U.S. Federal
Reserve Bank at the time of award plus one percent (1 %). As used in this Section, "rent" shall
mean the rent to be paid pursuant to Section 4 above and ail other monetary sums required to
be paid by the Tenant pursuant to the terms of this Lease.
18.3 Additional and Cumulative Remedies. In addition to the nonexclusive
remedies provided in Section 18.2 above, the Landlord shall have ail remedies now or hereafter
provided by law for enforcing the provisions of this Lease and the Landlord's rights hereunder.
Nothing m the preceding sections hereof affects the right of Landlord to equitable relief where
such relief is appropriate.
18.4 Lien. Tenant agrees that the rent and charges above reserved shall be a first

shall extend to and be binding on and inure to the benefit of not only Landlord and Tenant, but
each of their respective successors and assigns. Whenever in this Lease, reference is made to
either Landlord or tenant, the reference shall be deemed to include wherever applicable, their
successors and assigns the same as if in every case expressed.
20.5

Inspection. Landlord reserves the right to enter the Premises at any

reasonable time for the purpose of inspecting the Premises, collecting the rent and doing any
other act or thing reasonably necessary or proper for the preservation or care of the Premises.
20.6 Time of the Essence. Time is the essence of this Lease.
20.7 Headings, The headings or titles to tiie sections of this Lease are not a part
of this Lease and shall have no affect upon the constniction or interpretation of any part of this
Lease.
20.8 Entire Agreement. This Lease and any Addendum attached hereto, initialed
by the parties and made a part hereof, contain the entire agreement of the parties with respect
to the matters covered hereby, and no other agreement, statement or promise made by any party,
or to any employee, officer or agent of any party, which is not contained herein, shall be
binding or valid.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Lease the day and year first
above written.
LANDLORD
PEAY INVESTMENT COR

TENANT:
BODY FIRM AEROBICS, INC.

SrotpFelstea, Vice President

/Eynette Felsteof President
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Scott T.Evans, USB #6218
Heather L.Thuel, USB #10106
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)323.5000
Facsimile : (801)323.9037
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No.: 0504001206 PI
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY,

Judge: Fred D. Howard

Defendants.

The Court is hereby notified that DEFENDANTS GOLD GYM'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS was submitted by Defendants through their attorneys of
record, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on this \ 3 day of January, 2007
by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to the following:

S. Austin Johnson
JOHNSON LAW ASSOC.
345-B East University Pkwy
PO Box 970880
Orem, UT 84097-0880

^

_

^

A ^ J Q / ^ / /

X

Scott T Evans
Heather L Thuet
Attorney for Defendants

EXHIBTT E

Scott T.Evans, USB #6218
Heather L. Thuet, USB #10106
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 323.5000
Facsimile : (801)323.9037
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY,

DEFEND AN I COLD GYM S
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMFNTS
Case No.: 0504001206 PI

Defendants.
Judge: Fred D. Howard

Defendant, Gold's Gym, hereby supplements its response to plaintiffs first set of
interrogatories and requests for production of documents as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

Describe any reports of accidents, tripping of

persons, or slip and falls that have occurred in the parking lot at Gold's Gym in Provo.
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this as it is not teasonabl) limited m
scope, subject matter, location or time. Moreover, Interrogatory No. 9 is not likely
to lead to the discovery of admissibli t \ nl« in # Sttb|t t l fit iinl v iftmnf w ,«n m«» (Ins
objection Gold's Gym responds as follows: in addition to the incidents previously
t f |HIi li fl, on J< mi in 1 ' '(HI

in itiflu iiiniil 1i I) on black ice outsirii the front door

reported, on January 13, 2007, an individual fell on black ice outside the front door
of Gold's Gym.

DATED t h i s X ^ d a y of February, 2007
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P C

fott T Evans
Heather L Thuet
Attorneys for Defendant
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Scott T.Evans, USB #6218
Heather L. Thuet, USB #10106
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 323.5000
Facsimile : (801)323.9037
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff,
V.

Case No.: 0504001206 PI
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY,

Judge: Fred D. Howard

Defendants.

The Court is hereby notified that DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS was submitted by Defendants through their attorneys of
record, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on this £2?*^day of February, 2007
by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to the following:

S. Austin Johnson
Johnson Law Firm, P.C.
345 B. East University Parkway
Orem, Utah 84058

-laf-

?ott T. Evtffis
Heather L. Thuet
Attorney for Defendants
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EXHIBIT G

JUL

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, SI ATE OF UTAH
NELDA P. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

2 2007

*Bi&g&>

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Date: July 2, 2007
Case No. 070102050

vs.

GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen
COMPANY,
1
Defendants.

This matter comes before the court on the following motions:
1.

The Defendant's motion for summary judgment filed on April 6, 2007.

2.

Defendant's motion filed on April 27, 2007, to strike Plaintiffs designation of
expert witnesses.

3.

Defendant's motion to compel discovery filed on April 30, 2007.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 13, 2005, Nelda P. Johnson ("Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Gold's Gym
and Peay Investment Company ("Defendants"), which the Defendants then filed answers to. In
her complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that she fell in the parking lot at Gold's Gym and injured her
knee.
The parties filed an attorney's Rule 26(f) planning meeting report and stipulated
scheduling order wherein the parties agreed that the deadline for conducting fact discovery would
be November 15, 2006. The deadline for identification of the Plaintiffs expert witnesses and
production of their expert witness reports would be December 15, 2006, which is 30 days from

i

the completion of fact discovery. The deadline for identification of Defendant's rebuttal expert
witnesses and production of reports was set at January 15, 2007, which is 60 days after the
Plaintiffs disclosure of expert witnesses and production of expert reports. In the first week of
December 2006, the Defendants agreed to the Plaintiffs request to extend fact discovery until
January 30, 2007. On March 2, 2007, Plaintiff filed her designation of expert witnesses, but then
negotiated another extension of time for providing her expert's reports.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 6, 2007. On April 24, 2007,
Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to respond to Defendants' summary judgment
motion.1 Defendants also filed a motion to strike the Plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses,
a motion to compel discovery, and a memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs motion for
extension of time. Plaintiff filed no other response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to strike the expert
designation.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
1. Defendants' Request for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." U.R.C.P. 56(c). Additionally, 'the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . ." Jackson v.

1

No request to submit for decision has been filed regarding Plaintiffs motion for a 45 day extension of
time. Plaintiff also has filed a motion to compel to which defendant has responded. No request to submit
for decision has been filed regarding this motion either.

Mateus, 70 P. 3d 78, 80 (Utah 2003) (internal citations omitted). Summary Judgment "denies the
opportunity of trial [and so] should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no
reasonable probability the party moved against could prevail. Utah State University of
Agriculture and Applied Sciences v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982).
As opposed to addressing the merits of the motion, plaintiff has sought only an extension
of time. Giving the plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, particularly believing that plaintiffs
counsel did not receive the motion and memorandum until two days before the memorandum in
opposition was due, this Court grants an extension but not that sought by the plaintiff. Plaintiff
sought an extension of 45 days, although her own memorandum indicated that the pertinent
affidavits could be obtained in a matter of days, not weeks. Further, by now a period of 45 days
has expired.
Like the defendant, this Court is construing defendant's motion for extension of time as a
rule 56 (f) affidavit. There is no explanation within plaintiffs motion for extension of time as to
why discovery could not have been obtained earlier. Nor is there any real explanation as to why
the affidavits could not be obtained in a faster manner. The motion for extension of time is
completely silent as to any specific allegation of evidence sought to be discovered. The court
further notes that extensions of time for discovery have previously been granted.
Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for extension is hereby granted only for the purposes of
responding to the merits of the motion and obtaining the two affidavits identified. This Court
considers discovery closed, unless stipulated to by the parties. Plaintiff shall have until July 9,
2007 to file any and all responses to the motion for summary judgment.

2. Defendants' Request to Strike Plaintiffs Designation of Expert Witnesses

Defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses is granted in part
and denied in part. As to any treating physician for whom records have previously been received
by defendants, such records may be considered reports for the purposes of rule 26.2 However, at
trial where no further report has been produced, the witness will be limited to those subjects
identified and supported in the medical records. Again, giving the plaintiff every benefit of the
doubt, any complete expert disclosures made prior to February 28th, 2007, 30 days after the end of
I
fact discovery shall be considered timely. It appears from the record that defendants gave an
extension to plaintiff to supply expert reports until March 18, 2007. While plaintiff did not meet
this exact date, it appears that the information concerning Dr. Wyman, including a full report and
previous testimony disclosures, has been made. As a result, defendant's motion as to Dr. Wyman
is hereby denied.
Plaintiff concedes that "Clay" and Leslie Thorton shall not be called as experts.
Accordingly, defendants motion as to "Clay" and Leslie Thorton is hereby granted.
Plaintiff asserts that plaintiffs expert designation filed March 2, 2007 complies with rule
26. Rule 26 (a)(3)(B) provides:
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall,
with respect to a witness who is retained were specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case were whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve
giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the
witness or party.
As plaintiff points out, this report may be signed by the witness or the party (or the party's
attorney on behalf of the party). However, it appears plaintiff has failed to consider the
I
This seems to comport with rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s language requiring reports of a witness who "is retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony in the case. . . ." since often treating physicians are employed firstly as a
healer and only secondarily as a witness, the reporting requirement of this rule arguably does not apply. However,
once a party seeks to introduce testimony which aids litigation but was not needed for the purposes of treatment, it
would appear that the party has placed that witness within the purview of the rule.

remainder of the rule which provides:
The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary
of the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all
publications authored by the witness within the preceding 10 years; the compensation to
be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the
witnesses testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.

The disclosures of the plaintiff barely contain the subject matter on which the experts are to
testify, with the exception of Dr. Wyman. As to all of the other experts, no summary of the
grounds is given for each opinion. The substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify are absent as well. This Court could perceive no facts stated in plaintiffs
disclosure. The qualifications of the witnesses is wholly absent. No indication is made as to any
publications, if they exist, authored by any witness. The compensation to be paid to the witness,
easily ascertainable, is absent. With the exception of Dr. Wyman, no list has been given of any
other cases in which the witnesses testified at trial or deposition within the preceding four years.
In sum, the disclosures are deficient and would not allow a party to assess the need to conduct
discovery connected with the expert testimony, and assuredly would not assist any party in
preparing for trial. Ultimately, the purposes of rule 26 have been circumvented. Both as to
initial disclosures, other disclosures, and expert disclosures, the purpose of the rules was to
encourage the free flow of information, not a hide matters until trial. David Jenkins is hereby
stricken as an expert for the plaintiff
Accordingly, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part consistent with the
above.

3, Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery
Defendants' motion to compel discovery remains unopposed by plaintiff. Further, the
motion provides a sufficient basis for relief. Accordingly, defendants motion to compel is hereby
granted, along with attorney's fees and costs for bringing the motion as requested.

CONCLUSION
Based on the above facts and analysis, the ruling of the court is as follows:
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied, until such time as plaintiff responds, or
July 9, 2007, whichever is earlier. Thereupon, defendant may submit issue for decision again.
2. Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses is granted in part and
denied in part.
3. Defendant's motion to compel is granted.
Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an appropriate order consistent with this
ruling and submit it to the court consistent with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 1/

day of July,
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EXHIBIT H

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NELDA P. JOHNSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

Date: September 17, 2007

v.
Case No. 070102050
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY,
Defendants.

Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen

This matter comes before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
motion has been fully briefed by both parties. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's
motion is granted.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following undisputed material facts are based on the plaintiffs response to facts
alleged by defendants' in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, facts which were not controverted by
the plaintiff are deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment.1

]

Under Rule 7, facts not controverted are deemed admitted. Where a fact is purportedly
controverted, but the non-moving party either fails to properly controvert the fact under Rule 7
(by providing ground disputing the fact with particularity and supporting the dispute by citation
to relevant materials) or fails to controvert the fact in a "genuine" way, a trial court may likewise
considei the asserted fact admitted.
In this case, the court could deem all of defendant's facts admitted by plaintiffs
wholesale failure to follow Rule 7(c)(3)(B). "A memorandum opposing a motion for summary
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
Page 1 of 11
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I,., d .-,

1. On July 7, 2004, plaintiff joined Gold's Gym.
2. As a condition of membership, plaintiff was required to sign a contract ("Contract")
that included the Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident clause ("Release").
3. Plaintiff read, signed, and agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of the
Release.
4. The Release executed by the plaintiff includes the following language:
...ANY PERSON USING THE EQUIPMENT OR THE FACILITIES DOES SO AT
THEIR OWN RISK...and the Gym shall not be liable to Buyer or Member for any claims,
demands, injuries, damages, or actions arising due to injury to Buyer or Member, their
person, or property arising out of or in connection with the use by Buyer or Member of
the services and facilities or the premises where the same is located and Buyer or Member
hereby holds the Gym, its employees and agents harmless from all claims which may be
brought against them by Buyer or Member or on either of their behalf for such injuries of
claims aforesaid.
5. On July 12, 2004, plaintiff tripped and fell in the parking lot at Gold's Gym at about
9:30 p.m. and injured her knee.
6. Plaintiffs son S. Andrew Johnson, daughter Jocelyn Vance, and son-in-law Justin
Vance were present in the Gold's Gym parking lot when plaintiff fell.
7. Prior to being informed by plaintiff of her injury and the defect in the parking lot that
caused it, defendants had never observed or been made aware of any dangerous condition, either
cracks or holes, existing within the asphalt parking lot.
8. Prior to plaintiffs fall, there had been no reports of any accidents or falls in the

controverted[.]" Further, additional facts to be considered must be separately stated and
numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials. The court specifically holds that as to
the facts hereinafter stated, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue.
Page 2 of 11

parking lot caused by cracks, holes, or broken asphalt at a time when there were more than 1,000
visitors per day at Gold's Gym.
9. During her visit to the gym only the day before her fall, plaintiff did not observe any
problems with the asphalt or trip hazards.
10. Plaintiff did not see the crack in the asphalt before she fell.
11. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that defendants had notice of any dangerous
condition existing in the parking lot prior to plaintiffs fall.
DISPUTED FACTS THAT ARE NOT MATERIAL
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for summary
judgment and states that summary judgment "shall be rendered if...there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In
determining whether summary judgment is proper, the court views the facts in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.
ANALYSIS

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted because (1) plaintiff released
defendant Gold's Gym from liability when she signed the Contract upon becoming a member of
the gym, and (2) plaintiff failed to show that defendants had actual or constructive notice of the
defect in the asphalt that caused her to fall. The court discusses each of these reasons in turn.
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I.

PLAINTIFF RELEASED DEFENDANT GOLD'S GYM FROM LIABILITY
WHEN SHE SIGNED THE RELEASE INCLUDED IN THE CONTRACT UPON
BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE GYM.
Although Utah case law strictly construes contract clauses that attempt to limit one's

liability, courts will enforce such terms if "the preclusion against negligence is clearly and
unequivocally stated." Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (Utah
1959). While the release of liability must be clearly and unequivocally stated, the rule of strict
construction does not require a specific reference to one party's negligence. See Freund v. Utah
Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 371 (Utah 1990) (holding that an agreement that did not
specifically mention the effect of one party's negligence was nevertheless effective to release the
party from potential negligence because of the "broad sweep of the language."). Indeed, the Utah
Court of Appeals noted almost twenty years ago that "the contemporary judicial trend is to limit
the application of the strict construction rule[]" and that "the law of Utah should develop
consistent with this trend." Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp., Ill P.2d 664, 667 (Utah
Ct.App. 1989).
A.

The Release in the Contract expresses a clear and unequivocal intent
by the parties that the plaintiff would release Gold's Gym from any
liability arising from the use of the equipment, the facilities, or the
premises of the gym.

As noted above, if a clause purporting to release one party from liability is clear and
unequivocal in its terms, a court will enforce the clause. In Russ v Woodside Homes, 905 P.2d
901, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted this requirement in the
context of a release clause in which the plaintiff agreed to hold defendant "harmless for 'any and
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all claims, damages, loss and expenses'" and "for 'any death, accident, injury, or other
occurrence resulting from visits to [defendant's] job site.'" The court cited to Freund for the
principle that although the provision did not explicitly mention negligence of the defendant, "the
word 'negligence' is not a talisman to enforce contracts avoiding potential liability." Id. at 905
(citing Freund, 793 P.2d at 370). The court stated, "A hold harmless provision is enforceable
when 'the broad sweep of the language employed by the parties clearly covers those instances in
which a party may be negligent.'" Id. (citing Freund, 793 P.2d at 371). The court found that the
provision clearly expressed the parties' intent to avoid the defendant's potential liability for
negligence and that it therefore was enforceable and barred the plaintiffs negligence claim
against the defendant. Id. at 906.
The language from the Contract signed by plaintiff is very similar to the provision at issue
in the Woodside Homes case. It states that "the Gym shall not be liable to Buyer or Member for
any claims, demands, injuries, damages, or actions arising due to injury to Buyer or Member...."
Although this does not explicitly mention negligence on the part of Gold's Gym, the language is
clearly broad enough to include those instances in which Gold's Gym may be negligent. The
language clearly and unequivocally expresses an intent by the parties that plaintiff will hold
defendant Gold's Gym harmless "from all claims[,]" including claims alleging negligence on the
part of defendant Gold's Gym.
B.

The plaintiffs injury, which was allegedly caused by a defect in the
asphalt in the Gold's Gym parking lot, is covered by the terms of the
Release.

It is a well-accepted tenet of contract law that "[i]f the language within the four corners
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of the contract is unambiguous, the parties['] intentions are determined from the plain meaning
of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Central
Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, Tfl2, 40 P.3d 599 (citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[a]n ambiguity exists where the language 'is
reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense.'" Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999
UT 89,1J13, 987 P.2d 48 (citation omitted). This court holds as a matter of law that the terms of
the Release are unambiguous, and that the term "premises" includes the parking lot in which the
plaintiff was injured.
One definition of "premises" in Webster }s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary is "a
building together with its grounds or other appurtenances." This is the plain meaning of the word
"premises" in everyday usage. Additionally, when taken in context, the use of the word
"premises" in the phrase "the use...of the services and facilities or the premises where the same is
located[,]" is not reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense or in a different
sense from the definition given above. Contrary to plaintiffs argument, the parking lot is clearly
covered by the terms of the release, and her claim based on her injury in the parking lot is within
the ambit of the release. Therefore, plaintiffs negligence claim is barred as to defendant Gold's
Gym.
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II.

THE DEFECT COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFF WAS TEMPORARY IN
NATURE, SO HER FAILURE TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANTS HAD PRIOR
NOTICE OF THE UNSAFE CONDITION IS FATAL TO HER CASE.
The court holds that the defect complained of by the plaintiff was temporary in nature, so

a failure to establish actual or constructive notice to the defendants and sufficient time to remedy
the condition is therefore fatal to her case.
In premises liability cases, Utah case law creates two classes of unsafe conditions: those
that are temporary, and those that are of a permanent nature. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R.
Co., 2004 UT 80, ^jl9, 104 P.3d 1185. Where unsafe conditions are temporary, a business owner
must have actual or constructive knowledge of the conditions and sufficient time after receiving
such knowledge to remedy the situation. Id In contrast, where the unsafe condition is
permanent-which is defined as a condition which was chosen or created by the business owner or
for which he is responsible-the business owner is deemed to have knowledge of the condition.
Id Plaintiff maintains that this case falls into the second category where an unsafe condition is
permanent and therefore notice of the condition is assumed. Plaintiff's memorandum in
opposition at 11. This court disagrees.
A.

The defect in the asphalt was temporary.

The Utah Supreme Court first articulated the difference between temporary and
permanent unsafe conditions in premises liability cases in Allen v Federated Dairy Farms, 538
P.2d 175 (Utah 1975) The court stated that the first class of cases "involves some unsafe
condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on the floor and usually where it is
not known how it got there." Id at 176 (emphasis included). In contrast, the second class of
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cases described by the court "involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such as: in
the structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or its manner of
use, which was created or chosen by the defendants (or his agents), or for which he is
responsible." Id. (emphasis included).
In Goebel, the plaintiffs injury was allegedly caused by a gap between rubber mats that
adjoined the road to a railroad crossing. 2004 UT 80, at \ 6. The plaintiffs argued that the gap
was a permanent unsafe condition of which the defendant railway company was deemed to have
knowledge. Id. at %\9. However, the Utah Supreme Court held that the gap was not a permanent
unsafe condition because "the defendant did not create the unsafe condition, and [was]
'responsible' for it only in the context of maintenance, not for its existence in the first place." Id.
at ^20. The court found that because "the proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's injury was the
breakdown or mechanical degradation of something that was not alleged to have been negligently
created or installed[,]" the gap was therefore a temporary unsafe condition of which the
defendant must have had notice in order to be held liable. Id. at ^[21.
Although plaintiff argues that the defect in the asphalt was permanent and therefore
required no notice, the court finds that the defect was temporary in nature. It is clear that the
alleged defect was not chosen or created by the defendants, and plaintiff does not argue that the
parking lot was "negligently created or installed." Nor were the defendants responsible for the
crack or hole in the asphalt beyond a responsibility "in the context of maintenance, not for its
existence in the first place." Similar to the Goebel case, the defect that was alleged to have
caused plaintiffs injuries was created by the "breakdown or mechanical degradation" of the
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asphalt. This court therefore holds that the defect in the asphalt was an unsafe condition that was
temporary in nature.2
B.

There is no evidence that defendants had actual or constructive notice
of the defect.

When an unsafe condition is temporary in nature, courts require "evidence that the
defendant had some kind of notice of the dangerous condition, together with evidence that the
defendant had that notice for a time sufficient for it to repair that condition." Id. at %L\. In fact,
the Utah Supreme Court stated that "evidence of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are
required to survive a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict." Id. at ^|22 (emphasis
added). In explaining the rationale for different notice requirements based on the nature of the
unsafe condition, the court stated, "[I]t is reasonable to presume that a party has notice of
conditions that the party itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume notice of conditions
that someone else creates..., that arise from malfunctions..., or that gradually evolve on their
own." Id.
In Goebel, the plaintiffs had no evidence that the defendant had actual notice, so they
argued that the defendant had constructive notice based on its failure to perform reasonable
inspections. Id at Tf23. However, the court rejected this argument because the plaintiff and the
plaintiffs' expert both failed to notice the gap themselves. Id In addition, the plaintiffs argued
that the gap must have evolved gradually over time, so the defendant would have noticed the gap

2

This conclusion is butressed by plaintiffs opposition which notes, with attached
photographs, the "repair" of the condition after the event.
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if it had been paying attention and therefore would have had a reasonable time to repair it. Id. at
1J24. The court likewise rejected this argument because the plaintiffs had introduced no evidence
that the gap had evolved gradually as opposed to being formed suddenly. Id. at P25. The court
also stated that even if the gap had existed for a long period of time, there was no reason to
believe that the defendant should have noticed it since there was no evidence that the defendant
did not reasonably inspect the railroad crossing. Id. The court found that because the plaintiffs
had offered no evidence that the defendant knew of the gap or the length of time for which the
defendant had such notice, their "mere hypothesis that the gap may have existed for some
unknown length of time does not suffice." Id.
The court's analysis in Goebel is controlling in this case.
If a plaintiff alleges that the defendant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous condition that the
defendant did not create (as in Schnuphase), negligently failed to repair a dangerous malfunction
in an otherwise safe system (as in Fishbaugh), or negligently allowed an otherwise safe condition
to degrade over time into a dangerous condition (as in the instant case), then evidence of notice
and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion for summary judgment[.]
Goebel, 2004 UT 80, \ 22, 104 P.3d 1185. As in Goebel, the plaintiff has produced no evidence
that defendants had actual notice of the defect in the asphalt. And while plaintiff has implied that
defendants did not conduct reasonable inspections of the parking lot, plaintiff has produced no
evidence to that effect. Plaintiff has also failed to produce evidence of the length of time the
defect in the asphalt existed. Because plaintiff has failed to introduce evidence that defendants
did not reasonably inspect the parking lot, that defendants knew of the defect, or the length of
time for which the defendants had notice, the plaintiff cannot recover on her claim as a matter of
law.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above facts and analysis, defendant's motion for summary judgment is
hereby granted. Counsel for defendants is instructed to prepare appropriate order consistent with
this ruling and adopting this memorandum decision by reference.
Dated this J[|_%ay of September, 2007.

Page 11 of 11

EXHIBIT I

PI

'S-,

K':1.'^;

•\)'

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NELDA P. JOHNSON,

RULING ON MOTIONS TO
RECONSIDER, STRIKE, AND COMPEL

Plaintiff,
v.

Date: November 29, 2007

GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT
COMPANY,
Defendants.

Case No. 070102050
Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen

This matter comes before the court on plaintiffs motion to reconsider, plaintiffs motion
to compel, and defendant's motion to strike photographs. For the reasons which follow
plaintiffs motions to reconsider and compel are denied and defendant's motion to strike
photographs is granted.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action was commenced when plaintiff filed a complaint on April 13, 2005. The
parties entered into a stipulated scheduling order whereby fact discovery would end November
15, 2006 and expert discovery would follow. The parties agreed to an extension of fact discovery
until January 30, 2007. After all of the dates had expired, the defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment on April 6, 2007. In response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff
did not file any substantive response, but instead filed a motion for extension of time to respond
to defendants' motion. No affidavit was submitted pursuant to rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. In fact, plaintiff never submitted for decision her motion for a 45 day extension

IK
1
X

Page 1 of 13
ftEC _4 2QQ7.

of time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. In addition to failing to submit her
motion, no response to the motion for summary judgment was filed within the 45 days initially
requested. Nevertheless, giving plaintiffs counsel every benefit, this court construed the motion
for extension of time as a rule 56(f) affidavit. This court allowed plaintiff to file a response even
though the motion for extension of time gave no explanation as to why discovery could not have
been obtained earlier, nor did it contain any explanation as to why opposing affidavits could not
be obtained in a more expeditious manner, and the motion was completely silent as to any
specific allegation of evidence sought to be discovered.
Plaintiff did file a response to motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2007. Plaintiff
did not request oral argument on the motion for summary judgment. On September 17, 2007 this
court issued a memorandum decision granting defendants summary judgment. An order
reflecting the memorandum decision was executed by this judge on October 17, 2007.
Apparently that same day plaintiffs counsel faxed a letter to the court asking the court to rule on
the motion to reconsider before executing the order. However, the order had already been
executed.
On October 10, 2007, plaintiff filed a "motion for reconsideration of order granting
summary judgment," along with a memorandum in support of this motion. The motion does not
assert that it is being brought pursuant to any rule under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
motion maintains that this court should reconsider its decision regarding summary judgment
arguing that: (1) this court wrongly concluded that plaintiff had released defendant Gold's gym
when she signed the membership agreement, (2) plaintiffs claimed did not arise from a temporary
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condition and therefore notice of the condition was not required, (3) that the issue of constructive
notice is a fact issue for the jury, and finally (4) that this court is the improper venue for this
cause of action.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE
Plaintiff has brought a motion to reconsider, a motion not enumerated by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. This court concludes that when a trial court issues a decision which disposes
of all claims in a matter a party is precluded from revisiting the case by way of a "motion to
reconsider." Accordingly, plaintiffs motion is denied.
For many years the appellate courts have been discouraging motions to reconsider. The
Utah Supreme Court in Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44 1]18 n. 5 stated:
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize motions to reconsider.
Although we have discouraged these motions, see Watkiss & Campbell v Foa &
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1063-65 (Utah 1991), they have proliferated in civil actions
to the extent that they have become the cheatgrass of the litigation landscape. We
acknowledge that the extraordinary circumstance may arise when it is appropriate
to request a trial court to reconsider a ruling. These occasions are rare, however,
and we encourage attorneys to reverse the trend to make such motions to
reconsider routine.
Having ascertained that repeated suggestions had fallen on generally deaf ears, the court in Gillett
v. Price, 2006 UT 24 cut down a wide swath of the motion to reconsider cheatgrass by holding
that "regardless of the motion's substance, post-judgment motions to reconsider and other
similarly titled motions will not toll the time for appeal because they are not recognized by our
rules." The court noted, however, that uthis holding applies to post-final -judgment motions to
reconsider; it does not affect motions to or decisions by the district courts to reconsider or revise
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nonfinal judgments, which have no impact on the time to appeal and are sanctioned by our
rules." The issue in Gillett was whether the Utah Court of Appeals had properly held that
plaintiffs notice of appeal was not timely. Thus the holding of the Supreme Court of Utah in
Gillett addressed a motion to reconsider and its ability to toll the time for appeal. Accordingly,
the holding of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gillett does not truly address motions to
reconsider brought before a final judgment is entered. That is the circumstance here.
The remaining cheatgrass, but for a few select stalks, should be hewn down. This court
does not believe that all motions to reconsider are in fact sanctioned by the rules when placed
before the trial court pre-fmal-judgment. In noting the fact that the rules sanction, arguably, a
motion to reconsider, the Utah Supreme Court in Gillett referenced rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, a close reading of the rule shows the sanction of motions to
reconsider, otherwise known as revision of prior decisions, to be limited.
Rule 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon express direction for the entry
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before entry of judgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(emphasis added). Thus, the rule contemplates that other forms of decision, such as a
memorandum decision, are subject to revision only when remaining claims or rights and
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liabilities have not been adjudicated. However, in cases such as the present one where the grant
of summary judgment disposes of all claims, there is no good reason that motions to reconsider
should be recognized under this rule. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly rules 52
and 59, provide sufficient avenues of redress for the extraordinary circumstance alluded to in
Shipman.
For example, it may occur that, between the grant of summary judgment and the signing
of the final order, precedent is established by an appellate court which brings into question the
validity of a trial court's ruling. Likewise, it may occur that counsel ascertains after a ruling, but
before a judgment is entered, that both parties failed to cite controlling and determinative
precedent which likely should change the outcome of the decision. In either event, under rule 59
a party could make a motion for a new trial claiming an error in law. See rule 59(a)(7);
Crestwood Cove Apts. Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, ^[40.(trial court can grant new trial
where "prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice").1 Also,
should new evidence be found which could not have been, with reasonable diligence, discovered
prior to the ruling on the motion, a motion for a new trial is a proper remedy. See rule 59(a)(4).
Utah's appellate courts have already held that a motion for a new trial following summary
judgment is procedurally correct and available to litigants. Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson,
797 P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990), With this remedy readily available, no reason exists to

1

In fact, in the past courts have construed motions to reconsider as motions for a new
trial. Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888 (Utah App. 1995).
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perpetuate motions to reconsider in cases that have been fully adjudicated on motion.2
Further, the Gillett court's dicta concerning motions reconsider pre-fmal-judgment fails to
address the holding in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966). In Drury, the
Utah Supreme Court held that once a trial court had granted a motion for a new trial, and where
no inadvertence, mistake, or irregularity appeared in connection with obtaining the order, the trial
court had no authority to entertain and grant a motion to reconsider or review its own ruling.3
The Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Gillette provides further arguments to disallow
pre-fmal-judgment motions to reconsider as well. First, the court restated:
In fact, post-judgment motions to reconsider are not recognized anywhere in either the
Utah rules of appellate procedure or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Gillette, 2006 UT 24 ^[6. In point of fact, motions to reconsider per se are not found in the rules
at all. The court then went on to state:

2

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide other avenues of redress to provide a trial
court ample opportunity to correctly address an issue. Rules 59(e) and 52(b) both allow a court
to alter or amend a judgment, amend findings, and alter a judgment consistent with the changed
findings. While rulings on summary judgement do not entail findings per se, a court must
determine, or find, that no genuine issue of dispute remains.
3

The Drury court noted:

If the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion for
reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself, the question arises, why
should not the other party who is now ruled against be permitted to make a motion for rereconsideration, asking the court to again reversed himself? Tenacious litigants and
lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures and theoretically a judge could
go on reversing himself periodically at the entreaties of one or the other of the parties ad
infinitum.
Drury, 415 ?2d at 663.
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We are now persuaded that it is time this practice comes to an end. In our system, the
rules provide the source of available relief. They "[are] designed to provide a pattern or
regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts [can] follow and rely upon."
Id. at% citing Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966). Specifically
recognizing the onerous burden placed upon trial courts by vaguely labeled motions, the Gillett
court concluded:
Hereafter, when a party seeks relief from a judgment, it must turn to the rules to
determine whether relief exists, and if so, direct the court to the specific relief available.
Parties can no longer leave this task to the court by filing so-called motions to reconsider
and relying upon district courts to construe the motions within the rules.
Id. Unless the holding of Gillett is extended to pre-final-judgment rulings which adjudicate all
claims as well, the burden upon the trial courts will remain. As shown here, there exists no
reason to limit this analysis to post final judgment scenarios.
The reasons for implementing a rule disallowing motions to reconsider when a ruling has
completely disposed of a case are highlighted by plaintiffs motion to reconsider in this case. For
the most part plaintiff is simply re-arguing her case. To some extent plaintiff is attempting to
supplement the record, perhaps hoping that the appellate court will not be able to make a
distinction between the record before the trial court at the time summary judgment was granted
and evidence or arguments presented subsequent to the memorandum decision.4 It does not
advance the interests of justice or the efficiency of the courts to essentially allow parties to reargue or re-present matters to the court when significant time has already been expended in a
memorandum decision.

4

An appeal in this matter has already been filed.
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This concern is even more egregious in this case where the plaintiff party had an
exceptionally long extension in which to respond to the motion for summary judgment. The
entirety of the discovery period in the case had already concluded. Knowing that a grant of
summary judgment was possible, this court would assume that all evidence within plaintiffs
possession or control would have already been brought before the court. Additionally, even if
information has been presented in the motion to reconsider which was not presented before the
court made its memorandum decision in September of this year, at a minimum a party should
have to show that somehow evidence was not reasonably attainable prior to the court's decision
before the court should consider it in any way. Plaintiffs memorandum is silent on this issue,
except for the allegation that certain pictures taken long after the event, and arguably irrelevant
for determination of this case, were for ambiguous reasons unavailable.5
For these reasons, plaintiffs motion to reconsider is hereby denied.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER LACKS MERIT
Even if the court were to consider the motion on the merits, the motion should be denied.
Re-argument and assertion of new facts. Plaintiff provides nothing new in the motion
to reconsider concerning this court's ruling that the release signed by the plaintiff relieved Gold's
Gym of liability in this matter. Plaintiffs simply re-argues her case. The arguments were not

5

For example, while in opposition to a motion to strike plaintiff argues that defendants
should have subpoenaed the photographs, plaintiff fails to recognize that this same argument
obliterates any reasonable argument for reconsideration based upon the photographs. Could not
plaintiff have subpoenaed the pictures herself, thus having them in her possession in a timely
manner to oppose a summary judgment motion?
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persuasive before, and they are not persuasive now.
In her original opposition to the motion for summary judgment plaintiff claimed:
Plaintiffs injury arose from the second class of a dangerous condition.
This second class of premises liability arises where the defendant is responsible for the
condition, he is deemed to know the condition and no proof of notice is necessary, [sic]
Plaintiff continues to pursue this theory in the motion to reconsider; that is, that the cause of the
fall was not a temporary condition. This court simply disagrees with plaintiffs contention,
although the court notes that in plaintiffs motion to reconsider she attaches her own declaration,
where in paragraph 7 she refers to the place of her fall as "broken asphalt." In other words, it
was asphalt which originally was not broken. That which is broken and can be repaired is
transitory, and therefore temporary. Thus, her own declaration undermines her stated position.
Plaintiff submits a declaration of the plaintiff, which is not really a matter to be
reconsidered, but new evidence for which the plaintiff gives no reason could not have been
presented in the initial motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff even tries to insert the hearsay
statements borne of our own private investigator}7 efforts. These statements are inadmissable.
Additionally, pictures not previously produced showing the scene of the accident four years after
the slip and fall are submitted for "reconsideration," even though the court has never considered
them.
Plaintiff now argues that the slip and fall resulted from a design defect, although there is
not now, nor within the motion was originally presented to the court, any evidence whatsoever
that any defect that existed was by design or existed because of the way the asphalt was laid.
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Again, in the plaintiffs own words, it was "broken asphalt."
Plaintiff also claims that the matter should be reconsidered because defendants have
failed to respond to discovery. Plaintiff points out that she filed a motion to compel in May of
2007 and now asks the court to rule on the motion. Because plaintiff could have asked this court
to rule on the motion to compel long before summary judgement was granted, any plea now to
re-open this case for further discovery is simply unreasonable. If plaintiff had forgotten that she
had filed a motion to compel, it was clearly put squarely to her attention when this court in its
initial memorandum decision denying summary judgment noted that the motion to compel had
been filed but not ruled upon because no notice to submit ever had been filed with the court. See
July 2, 2007 Memorandum Decision pg. 2, note 1. Thus, even where the court pointed out that
all plaintiff needed to do was file a notice to submit two months prior to ruling on this matter,
plaintiff failed to do so. Accordingly, plaintiffs arguments that defendants have tied her hands
fail.
The sum and substance of plaintiff s opposition to the original summary judgment, which
is now put forth again, is that speculation should rule the day. No material evidence of notice of
a dangerous condition was brought forth. One thousand patrons crossed the same parking lot
without complaint daily. Plaintiff herself, both the day before her fall and at the time she fell, did
not see any defect in the asphalt. Plaintiff claims that notice after the fall, as well as other events
after the fall, support an inference of notice prior to the fall. This court disagrees.
Plaintiff is further speculating on how long the condition existed. Plaintiff is asking this
court to submit the matter to a jury so the jury can speculate both on what caused the plaintiffs
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fall, and if it was the condition of the parking lot, how long the condition had existed. In Goebel
the court stated:
[Not] only will the jury have to speculate about whether [defendant] had notice of the
dangerous gap in the first place, it would also have to speculate about whether
[defendant] had notice far enough in advance to repair the gap before [plaintiffs]
accident.
Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80 ^f 25. As stated, this court will not submit a
case of speculation to the jury for determination, since as a matter of law where speculation is
employed the evidence does not preponderate one way or another.
Challenge to venue. Plaintiffs challenge to venue in the American Fork department of
the Fourth District Court is meritless. First, Utah Code Ann. §78-13-10 does not preclude
transferring this case to the American Fork department.6 The venue provisions of the Utah Code
provide that an action must be tried in the proper county. American Fork is in the same county as
Provo.
Plaintiff claims that the jury pools between Provo and American Fork will differ. There
is no basis for plaintiffs contention. In fact, the jury pools and how they are selected are
I
identical between Provo and American Fork. A single clerk, located in the Provo courthouse,
compiles the jury pools from within Utah County for all juries in the county, whether located in
Provo, Spanish Fork, Orem, or American Fork.
Lastly, a party cannot wait until a final determination of the case and then challenge the
venue where the case was decided. Plaintiff has simply waived this argument.

6

The case was assigned due to the recusal of the previously assigned judge.
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PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL IS MOOT
Because the court finds plaintiffs motion to reconsider to be procedurally defective, and
because the court does not find a sufficient basis to set aside its previous memorandum decision
and order, the issue of plaintiff s motion to compel has been rendered moot and is therefore
denied.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendant's motion to strike is granted. Plaintiff claims this court cannot consider the
motion to strike unless the court first grants the motion to reconsider. Plaintiff makes this claim
even though the pictures at issue are appended to the motion to reconsider and form the basis for
the relief sought. This conclusion is illogical. The point is whether this court should consider
them or strike them.
Any materials not previously submitted to the other party prior to the initial motion for
summary judgment should not be filed with the court. Plaintiff has not explained why she could
not subpoena the photographs from the individual holding them long prior to the motion foi
summary judgment. New evidence should only be considered when a properly brought motion
for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence is brought before the court.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs motion to reconsider is denied both procedurally
and upon the merits. Plaintiffs motion to compel is denied as being moot. Defendant's motion
to strike the photographs submitted with the motion to reconsider is hereby granted. Defendant's
counsel shall prepare an order consistent with rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 29th day of November, 2007.

;\^&^e David N. Mortensen
ou$|h District Court Judge
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